Daily Report

East Europe

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UN: Sarajevo, Zagreb Blocking RRF Deployment

AU1708181595 Paris AFP in English
1806 GMT 17 Aug 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] United Nations, Aug 17 (AFP)—The Bosnian and Croatian Governments are blocking the deployment of the rapid reaction force [RRF], which could compel the United Nations to put the issue before the Security Council, a UN spokesman said Thursday [17 August].

"After extensive negotiations between the UN and the Bosnian and Croatian Governments, there is still no agreement on the terms for deployment of the rapid reaction force," said Fred Eckhard, spokesman for Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali.

Around 8,000 men making up two brigades are now deployed in the theater on the Croatian coast and in Bosnia, Eckhard said

The force, drawn from British, Dutch and French troops, was created to back up allied peacekeepers currently in place in the former Yugoslavia.

"But their unconditional freedom of movement is at issue," he added.

"It is hoped that the situation can be resolved shortly through negotiations; failing that, the matter might have to be brought to the attention of the Security Council," Eckhard said. [passage omitted]

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AD Urges Government To Help Serb Refugees

AU1708143395 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 16 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In a statement for television, the Democratic Alliance [AD] has expressed concern over the tragedy of thousands of Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian families that are violently being evicted from their territory, a situation that carries the danger of the conflict being transferred to Kosova because of Belgrade plans to settle Krajina Serb refugees there.

Joining the other parties and the Albanian Government, the AD strongly protests any plan aimed at colonizing Kosova. However, the AD expresses its solidarity with the victims of war in former Yugoslavia, and suggests that, alongside its resolute position against the colonization of Kosova, the Albanian Government should show readiness to help the refugees.

Parties Object to AD Call

AU1708143195 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 16 Aug 95

[Report by Rezear Xhaxhiu with recorded passages in quotation marks]

[FBIS Translated Text] We must offer the Serbs our help, just as we offered help to the Bosnians, Neritan Ceka, the Democratic Alliance [AD] leader, told GAZETA SHQIPTARE.

For Ceka, these refugees convey the message of peace and not war: "I think that a refugee is a refugee and has no nationality. If we have opened the doors to the Muslim Bosnians, treating them as victims of an absurd war and ethnic cleansing, we should set an example as a state that is open to any population group that suffers a calamity, showing a spirit of objection to the policy of ethnic cleansing, regardless of which state is organizing it, whether it be Milosevic, Tudjman, or anyone else."

For Neritan Ceka, it is a question of the Serbs staying in Albania for a finite period, in the certainty that the day will come for them to return to their lands in Krajina. That is what Ceka told the radio program today in a position that is destined to create diametrically opposed polemics and stands.

The first objection seems to come from the Socialist Party offices. Mr. Namik Dokle approaches Ceka's humanism with reserve, underlining that: "I would not agree that the Serb refugees be placed on the same level as the Bosnian refugees for two reasons. First, because the Serb refugees are refugees of a state that is the perpetrator of the war and tragedy that is currently going on. Second, the Serbian state is using the Krajina refugees to colonize Kosova. That being the case, it would be wrong to give the green light simply for the sake of humanism."

For Mr. Dokle, it is clear that the issue is a delicate one, considering that it is a question of a population of an aggressor state, one that has the same aims against Kosova and its environment.

The Republican Cerciz Mingomataj responds in the same vein. While the Republican Party's secretary general believes that help for refugees is a humanitarian act, such as could happen to anyone, seen in the light of the possibility that other peoples could become refugees, the Albanian Government should choose which refugees come first—the Albanians of Bosnia, the Kosovars, or the ones from an area of conflict. "In this respect, I would be a bit mature and not completely agree that the Serbs should by all means come to Albania. The Serbs should not come to Albania as Serbs, as they are a nation. It would be an apple of discord as we do not want them to go to Kosova and create a center of tension and an open quarrel. It is known that the Serbs are ready for this. If we bring them to Albania, it seems to me that the quarrel will double."

Ceka's assertion comes right after the settlement in Kosova of over 700 Serbs from Zepa and Krajina.

Today I phoned the representative of the Republic of Kosova in Tirana, Mr. Iljaz Ramajli, who spoke about the tense situation in his country following the arrival of the first contingent in Kosova. For Mr. Ramajli, this is part of official Belgrade's well-known strategy toward Kosova and its future. "The settlement of the refugees in Kosova is objected to because current Serb policy intent is to instrumentalize the settlement of Serb refugees in Kosova with the aim of realizing its plan to colonize Kosova and alter its ethnic composition."

Asked to comment on politician Ceka's statement on Albania's acceptance of Serb refugees, diplomat Ramajli added, choosing his words carefully: "Meanwhile, as regards the pronouncement of the call to accept a number of Serb refugees in Albania, I think that this is a matter for the Albanian state authorities, who will know better how to behave and to decide on this problem."

It seems that the AD leader's statement has unleashed a debate and polemics in the offices of other Albanian political organizations, too. Comments consider Ceka's position to be mainly an effort to gain political profile, but in a wrong and hastily found way.

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Bids for Telecommunications Privatization

95BA0289A Athens TO VIMA TIS KIRIAKIS in Greek 25 Jun 95 p D3

[Unattributed article: "Tirana Seeks Strategic Investor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Albanian telecommunications organization, Albanian Telecom, is being privatized, and "strategic investors" throughout the world are searching maps to determine exactly where Tirana is located. The government of this neighboring country has decided to sell to a foreign telecommunications organization a percentage of shares—49 or 51 percent—and at the same time offer the organization's management to the buyer. In fact, the Albanian Government has been speeding up the privatization process, seeking to complete the work within eight months at the latest. The reason for the haste by the Albanian Government officials is linked to the forthcoming elections in the first six months of 1996 and to the apparent change of political alliances.

The first step in the privatization process is bidding involved in acquiring an adviser who, working together with Albanian authorities—Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications and Ministry of Privatization—would plan and organize procedures for finding the strategic investor who, among other requirements, would have the desire to contribute, through investments, to the development of the Albanian telecommunications system that is still in the era of hand-operated telephones and handwritten accounting methods.

The bidding to find an adviser is in full swing while the results are expected in the first part of July. The winner will come from a "tight list" of six cartel candidates who remain after the first round. Prominent among those six is the Greek candidate. Specifically, the Greek financial advisory firm Alpha Finance (subsidiary of the Alpha Credit Bank), in cooperation with the law firm M&P Bernitsas and with the British investment bank Barkleys de Zoete Wedd Ltd (BZW), which is active on the Greek market, is in the front line of the contest, competing with powerful merchant banks such as those of British origin, namely NM Rothschild & Sons and Lazard Brothers.

Specifically, the other five candidates are: (1) the cartel made up of NM Rothschild—Squire, Sanders & Dempsey—KPMG & Kirmar International (all of those participating in the cartel come from the United Kingdom); (2) the cartel of German interests made up of Roland Berger & Partner and Scheele, Swartz, Zielke & Partner; (3) the cartel of the British Lazard and the Italian Telos Management; (4) the American cartel of Wesserstein Perrella & Co, Reid & Priest, TMG and KFM; and (5) the American firm Booz Allen & Hamilton.

The results of this peculiar battle that has broken out in Tirana will become known in the first days of July and then the race will begin to find the strategic investor. The number of such investor candidates is not unlimited, as diplomatic circles in Tirana observe, and boils down to state telecommunications organizations of countries in the Mediterranean region. The French of France Telecom, the Spanish of Telefonica, the Italians of the STET, and the Greeks of the OTE [Greek Telecommunications Organization] will be under consideration to the extent that Albanian authorities so desire. In any case, the Albanian market, either before or after the 1996 elections, will open up offering opportunities for expanding investment programs and initiatives. Besides, prior to next spring's elections, it is expected that the first permit will be issued for mobile telephones (the GSM system).

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Academic Assesses National Security Concept

AU1708122295 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 15 Aug 95 p 3

[Interview with Professor Nansen Bekhar by Tsvetana Bozhinova of the Balkan Agency; place and date not given: "National Security Concept Has No Political Hue"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Bozhinova] Professor Bekhar, in March 1995 the defense minister signed an order putting you in charge of a group of experts charged with preparing the national security concept, and an interdepartmental government commission was also set up to develop this concept. Within less than six months, the concept was prepared and submitted to the Council of Ministers. Can you tell us something about the team that prepared the document, it would be interesting to hear about its history.

[Bekhar] The concept is the result of lengthy analytical work by various experts. To date, 12 national security concepts have been drafted in Bulgaria, and I am the author of two of them. The first one was produced by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences at the request of the Presidency. I worked on it together with General Stoyan Andreev. The second one was prepared on the instructions of the Bulgarian Business Bloc. [passage omitted]

[Bozhinova] What new features does your concept contain, compared with the earlier versions?

[Bekhar] Our document is the first one of its kind to be based on the new internal and external conditions under which Bulgaria's national security system has to function. It is certainly the first concept that makes well-argued connections between the internal and foreign threats to our security and considers their military and nonmilitary aspects and the existing potential risks. The threats are considered as a continuing process, not as a static state of affairs, thus avoiding any possible danger of creating an artificial image of the enemy.

[Bozhinova] You paid great attention to the geopolitical dimensions of security.

[Bekhar] The concept embodies the premise that European security is indivisible, and that its structure cannot be rationally developed unless there is stability in every one of the regions of the old continent. In this context, the security of the Balkans is regarded as a factor affecting European security.

What is even more important, the concept also covers issues of economic, social, demographic, and ecological security, and for the first time offers premises for so-called information security. As regards military security, the entire concept in this field is built on the basis of the "defensive strategy," which is largely predetermined by the conditions under which the reform in the Bulgarian Army is being carried out. We should also stop the process of dismantling the information structures, and Bulgaria, like every other normal country, should secure a monopoly on information of strategic and social importance. In this context, the concept pays special attention to the internal aspects of security, such as restoring the importance of intelligence and counterintelligence and increasing the authority of the law protection organs in combating crime and defending public order.

[Bozhinova] Does the concept contain any political aspects?

[Bekhar] Absolutely not. The concept avoids any confrontational tone. It is politically neutral, does not have any political hue, and is based solely on Bulgaria's national interests and our nation's ideals. Our team has tried to ensure that it is free of party bias and premises reflecting the interests of any group in Bulgarian society.

[Bozhinova] Despite this, the attacks against the concept have already started. In your view, in which directions will they be aimed?

[Bekhar] It is inevitable that the concept will be criticized by those who advocate that we should "immediately" and unconditionally join NATO as a guarantee for our national security. Incidentally, this stance is causing some perplexity even among NATO representatives, as became clear during the Rose-Roth conference that was held in Sofia at the beginning of June. The concept clearly states that one of the strategic directions of our policy should be to prepare for and conduct negotiations on becoming full members of the European Union, NATO, and other organizational structures of free and democratic states, while taking our state interests fully into account. This means that we support the idea of equal and mutually beneficial relations with all of the European security structures. As it became clear from the meeting of the intergovernmental committee of the Western European Union in 1994, not until 1996 will the Western European Union and NATO develop a united position on the question of accepting new countries into the European defense structures. Accordingly, it is both dangerous and unnecessary to politicize this issue. Moreover, the concept explicitly emphasizes that in the event of any expansion of the European structures it is necessary to respect the interests of all European countries, Russia included. Anyone who has closely studied the document should realize that we have tried to rise above narrow party interests

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and to reach consensus on issues that are of vital importance for our country's development. [passage omitted]

Premyanov Views BSP-Cabinet Relations

AU1708194695 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 15 Aug 95 pp 12-13

[Interview with Krasimir Premyanov, leader of the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group, by Tatyana Vasileva; place and date not given: "War With the Cabinet, Even One Waged by Lukanov, Is Doomed to Failure"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vasileva] Mr. Premyanov, is the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] distancing itself from the government and its parliamentary group?

[Premyanov] It depends on what we understand by the word party. One should not regard certain assessments by individuals in politics as incontrovertible—they do not reflect general feelings. Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but no one should believe that his view is of greater value for the interests and ethics of the whole party.

[Vasileva] Why, then, do your critics allege that you are not fulfilling the party program?

[Premyanov] This criticism unquestionably comes from disingenuous interpreters of the situation. What do you have in mind?

[Vasileva] Aleksandur Lilov has made such criticisms....

[Premyanov] Many people are apt to quote Lilov's statements out of context. He talks about the party, government, and parliamentary group with great goodwill. Lilov was not the originator of the intrigues and plots to create an unhealthy atmosphere within the BSP leadership. You must look elsewhere for those responsible.

[Vasileva] Do you know where they are?

[Premyanov] Only a good analyst can find that out. I only want to stop you looking in the wrong direction....

[Vasileva] How much real influence do Lilov and Lukanov have in the BSP?

[Premyanov] I could blame Lilov for overdoing it in distancing himself from actively joining in the work of the party leadership. Perhaps out of excessive tactfulness, he is not making sufficient use of the opportunity to work on important problems affecting the BSP in the Center for Strategic Research.

[Vasileva] What about Andrey Lukanov?

[Premyanov] Since his time as prime minister, Lukanov has perhaps been charged with too much energy, and he is now probably seeking a field to apply it. I hope that Lukanov will find this field and that it will prove to be of benefit for the entire party.

[Vasileva] Does a state of war exist between Lukanov and the cabinet?

[Premyanov] Such a war is doomed to failure, if anyone in the party ventures to start it. This applies even to a figure of Lukanov's rank.

[Vasileva] Do you have the impression that Zhan Videnov is creating his own elite?

[Premyanov] No. The persons who are entering this elite are linked with various professional and age groups, they come from various teams within the party. Therefore, I cannot say that Videnov has created some kind of elite circle around himself.

[Vasileva] What are your relations with the prime minister like?

[Premyanov] The same as they were five years ago. I trust him, respect him, and consider that those who seek traces of dishonesty or hypocrisy in him do not know him well enough.

[Vasileva] Is Videnov an authoritarian type?

[Premyanov] No, he is a responsible type. Zhan is a politician who wants the things that the party declared to society to become a reality.

[Vasileva] Have you noticed any signs of the prime minister trying to merge party with state power?

[Premyanov] This is another piece of nonsense. Can you name any democratic society in which, when a party wins the elections, its leader does not become prime minister? If you think that this democratic way of doing things that is applied in other countries is undemocratic, you know little about the theory and practice of democracy.

[Vasileva] However, did not Lilov and Lukanov share the power on a previous occasion?

[Premyanov] You forget that there have been many dynamic changes since 10 November 1989. At that time, we first had to decide who was to lead the party, and then choose the leader of the government, and all this in a different power situation. Now, following the elections, the opportunity was offered of applying the democratic principle in a perfectly normal way. Bulgaria needed a party that was ready to assume the responsibility of government. I can see no better sign of this readiness than for it to choose its leader for prime minister.

[Vasileva] Have you noticed any desire on Videnov's part to eliminate his rivals for political power?

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[Premyanov] Anyone who has failed to understand that one of the main changes that has occurred in the BSP is its renunciation of centralism, knows nothing about the party. The BSP Statute does not sanction an authoritarian leadership, so that no objective conditions exist for BSP leaders to acquire absolute power.

[Vasileva] Nevertheless, do you not think that Videnov has distanced himself from the party for the sake of the cabinet?

[Premyanov] I would not want us to set our course on the basis of subjective opinions. All those who take part in politics devote every moment of their working days to the party, in different aspects and from different angles. Surely, it is the BSP's job to implement the party program, is it not?

[Vasileva] Is there a possibility of the BSP splitting into two wings—hard-line communists and reformers?

[Premyanov] Communist values and ideals sound all very fine. No one could reject them as groundless, and they have many points in common with religious values. However, I am against mixing up the BSP's practical politics with the danger of our becoming connected with retrograde tendencies. Everything that the party has achieved so far has been aimed at freeing ourselves from the problems, errors, and legacies of the old practices and at assimilating the new trends in Europe and the world. The BSP was a factor that brought about the changes in the country.

[Vasileva] The former parliamentary secretary Plamen Nikolov claims that Videnov has made a study of the local BSP organizations with a view to bringing them into confrontation with the parliamentary group leadership and with you personally.

[Premyanov] This is the fruit of a way of thinking that is questionable regarding logic and soundness of mind.

[Vasileva] Have you noticed any attempts to arouse conflicts between different trends within the parliamentary group?

[Premyanov] No, a democratic community presupposes the existence of differences, but these are not based on local origins or on links with one or another politician. It is a matter of differences of opinion. It is the lack of such differences that poses a danger to the party. Only through the contest of ideas can we reach the truth.

[Vasileva] Does not the BSP's decision to ask Aleksandur Marinov [chairman of Sofia BSP Municipal Council] to prepare for the Sofia mayoral elections contain a trap for him if he fails?

[Premyanov] This is sick thinking. If you ask our 125 deputies the name of the man who dares to claim that he best understands the processes in the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group, at least 115 of them will say they have not heard of him. Not only do they not know him well enough, but even he himself does not clearly understand his own "scientific" observations.

Our statute states that the right to organize and hold elections and to nominate candidates is allotted from the bottom upwards. In the case of the local, the lowest level at which responsibility is assumed is the BSP municipal council and its chairman.

[Vasileva] Are any BSP deputies dissatisfied with the policies of the cabinet or individual ministers?

[Premyanov] Yes, and individual deputies have often shown this. However, I do not think that their discontent was always justified; very often, it was based on prejudices or inadequate understanding of the problems.

[Vasileva] How did you deal with such expressions of discontent in the parliamentary group?

[Premyanov] I had no such intention. The parliamentary group is made up of people who feel responsible for the policies of the government that they elected and for the policies of the Democratic Left as a whole.

[Vasileva] Will the BSP hold an extraordinary congress, as some people suggested at the BSP national party conference?

[Premyanov] It all depends on what the party needs. If the BSP has to resolve extraordinary issues, it might convene an extraordinary congress. However, at the BSP national conference no well-founded arguments were put forward for holding an extraordinary congress.

[Vasileva] Has the row about the DUMA newspaper affected feelings within the BSP?

[Premyanov] In my view, there was no reason to stir up this row, because there was no real topic to cause conflict between the party and the newspaper. I am worried about the paper's declining circulation, but this is a matter for the editors. We have such a talented chief editor in Stefan Prodev, and he will certainly find ways to increase DUMA's circulation. If he is worried about the sponsorship and financial aid that he has been given, that is his affair. The newspaper must make a profit and it must decide, itself, who is to assist it.

[Vasileva] Will the Democratic Left support a possible cabinet shuffle, and under what conditions?

[Premyanov] In the BSP, no obstacle exists to using any democratic means. However, such a means should not be set as a goal in itself, but should be a function for achieving a goal. Why make it [a cabinet shuffle] an

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absolute necessity, when there are no objective reasons for it? Personally speaking, at the moment, I see no reason to think that this is an immediate task.

[Vasileva] How has the controversy about Top Energy [joint Bulgarian-Russian company set up to handle gas and oil supplies] affected the parliamentary majority?

[Premyanov] Bulgaria is interested in having clear relations with Russia. They are beneficial for us. One of the areas in which we have no alternative is cooperation in the energy field. It is a matter of argument how far such a premise has been adequately realized through Top Energy. The form does not define the contents of the problem. Top Energy could be a splendid solution, if measures were taken to insure against the risk of it becoming a tool for individual and group interests at the expense of public interests.

[Vasileva] With what points do you disagree in connection with Top Energy?

[Premyanov] I am a pragmatist. The whole question is how to bring benefit to Bulgaria. We must have guaranteed energy resources on favorable terms so as to avoid any threat of an energy crisis and to enable us, by utilizing our assets, to participate on a share basis in projects that significantly exceed our national requirements. Personally, it is my hope that Top Energy will operate fully in Bulgaria's interest.

[Vasileva] Does the BSP have a clear position regarding Bulgarian private capital?

[Premyanov] At first hesitantly, but later strongly, the BSP came out in favor of patriotic and nationally responsible capital. It can play an exceptional role in the country's reforms, acting to the benefit of the Bulgarian people, not against its interests. The problem of ownership is a key issue. The public must form a more positive assessment of the Bulgarian entrepreneur who has created a modern technological enterprise, in which people enjoy their social rights and receive good wages, in comparison to a second company that is state-owned or cooperatively owned, but is economically inefficient.

[Vasileva] People criticize you for dividing capital into good and bad kinds.

[Premyanov] The kind of Bulgarian capital that creates manufacturing capacities and production and fights for positions in the world markets must be supported. The kind of capital that exports profits and sucks the juices out of the Bulgarian economy, even if it is a viable enterprise, does not work well for the country.

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Ministry Concerned About Exodus of Krajina Serbs

LD1708163495 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 17 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Pavel Bratinka, Czech deputy foreign minister, has conveyed a message to Bohumil Bernasek, minister counselor at the Croatian Embassy in Prague, indicating that the Czech Republic is concerned about the exodus of the Krajina Serbs.

Bratinka said that he asked the Croatian diplomat to inform him about the measures adopted by the Croatian side in order to bring the refugees back or to protect their lives and property.

Prime Minister, Poland's Oleksy Hold Talks

LD1708125295 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 17 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus and Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy are currently holding talks in the Silherovice castle near Ostrava. Miroslav Karas reports.

[Karas] Vaclav Klaus welcomed Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy in front of the Silherovice castle shortly before 1100.

I do not want to use any posh words, but we have an eminent interest in the best possible development of Czech-Polish relations and in the best possible mutual understanding, Vaclav Klaus said. He went on to say that there were no matters of dispute in the bilateral relations. It is necessary to meet and give [word indistinct] signals, the Czech prime minister said before the meeting.

Oleksy told journalists that the prime ministers would assess the current level of bilateral cooperation, which is developing very well. Despite that, we will look for new forms of closer contacts, the Polish prime minister said. There are several agreements waiting to be signed.

Both Poland and the Czech Republic are important countries in this region, and our views are important even beyond our bilateral relations. Vaclav Klaus is a famous and important personality in both the region and Europe. I think that whatever we agree on will be taken seriously, Oleksy said. On top of that, Czech-Polish relations influence the discussions held in the whole of Europe. I want our stances to be the same when it comes to the activities beneficial not only to the Czech Republic and Poland but also to other countries, the Polish prime minister said.

Before the meeting, Vaclav Klaus briefly commented.

[Begin Klaus recording] I am glad that we agreed during the European summit in Cannes that we would have this meeting. The choice of a meeting place near the border is not accidental. The subjects discussed are those indicated by Prime Minister Oleksy. [end recording]

[Karas] At this moment, both prime ministers are involved in the talks. After their walk in the castle gardens they will meet journalists.

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President Kovac Interviewed on Visit to U.S.

LD1708223195 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1650 GMT 17 Aug 95

[Interview with Slovak President Michal Kovac by correspondents Michal Tvarozek and Marian Kardos on 17 August; place not given; correspondents unidentifiable—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] Mr. President, a considerable sensation has been caused in Slovakia by an interview you granted during your visit to the United States to Radiozurnal, in which you passed on worries felt by certain U.S. officials about developments and democracy in Slovakia. It is said that those talks took place during a private dinner. How did you choose those invited to the dinner?

[Kovac] First, the selection was made by the Slovak Embassy with our participation. In my view, it reflected the fact that it was not an official meeting; it was a working dinner. Second, those were to be the people who arranged my meeting with Vice President Al Gore. Third, those were to be the people who in their jobs follow the developments in Central and East Europe, including the Slovak Republic.

On this occasion I did not consider it necessary to follow the protocol because it was not an official meeting. I am very glad that the meeting took place.

[Correspondent] Despite the fact that this was not an official meeting, the content of your interview for Radiozurnal in the end resulted in a note from the Department of State. Today you have already learned about the U.S. response. Could you comment on it in any way?

[Kovac] First of all, I would like to say that I do not think it was appropriate for the Slovak note to be dispatched on the basis of incomplete information provided by Radiozurnal and, perhaps, by an incomplete record sent by the Slovak ambassador to the United States. An official report that I was drafting and that I, in fact, handed over to the prime minister and the speaker of the National Council yesterday [16 August] should have been awaited.

As regards the second part of your question, I acquainted myself this morning with the U.S. response to our note. I am satisfied with the response. I think it is fully in line with what I learned in the United States—above all, during my talks with Vice President Al Gore.

[Correspondent] You mentioned, Mr. President, that speaking on Slovak radio you had interpreted your talks with White House officials with great tact. Does that mean that objections to the Slovak Republic were formulated in a very specific, a wider, or perhaps a more emphatic way?

[Kovac] I would not call them objections. These are more like comments, more like views. Yes, in some questions they were expressed in a more emphatic, a more unequivocal way. I passed them on in a slightly milder form.

[Correspondent] How did you react to them? I am asking this in the context of the suspicion felt by some members of our public that you did not defend Slovak interests sufficiently.

[Kovac] It is a pity that we are unable to make public all of the information. However, I would attempt to elucidate it at least partially.

I briefed them about positive aspects of our development. I also mentioned some problems. If our partners held views on Slovak internal affairs that, in my view, were inaccurate, I described and explained the reality to them. If it happened to be comments on the matters I criticize at home, naturally, I could not say anything but that I saw things in a similar way and that it was my stance, as well.

I expressed my hope that these were just our teething problems, the kind of problems probably occurring in other postcommunist countries, too. I did express my conviction that we were able to solve these internal matters.

Therefore, I have to refute the allegations suggesting that I was complaining, that I insulted the government or the prime minister. On the other hand, I do not share the view that whatever happens in Slovakia must be defended at any cost. If there are processes contradicting democracy, the Constitution, or other essential principles, and if I criticize these affairs at home, I cannot hold two different views.

I know myself that U.S. officials often emphasize that, in the name of friendship and cooperation, the U.S. Government shares it views and concerns about the development in Slovakia with Slovak officials, including the president, the prime minister, the deputies, and so forth. This applies not only to the U.S. Government but also to other governments, particularly the governments of the European Union member states.

[Correspondent] In fact, you stressed several times, Mr. President, that the United States does not intend to intervene in our affairs but that it wants to have those critical comments about the development in Slovakia passed on to other representatives of the government coalition and the opposition. Do you consider this step to be really appropriate at present?

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[Kovac] I think that, whenever there is an opportunity to meet those officials either in our country or in the United States, such an opportunity must be taken up. Whenever a country is involved that supports us in our efforts to integrate into the European Union, or in this case also into NATO, we must, of course, listen to its comments and views about our internal political process because this process has to adhere to certain parameters in order to make us capable of fulfilling the conditions for membership in these integration groups, for joining them.

[Correspondent] Is not this affair, Mr. President, threatening to influence our relations with the United States and perhaps other countries, especially in the context of rather contradictory reactions to your interview?

[Kovac] I do not think so at all. Diplomatic notes have, after all, been exchanged, a U.S. response to that of our government has been received. From the U.S. response we can unequivocally draw the conclusion that its existing interest in friendly development of relations with the Slovak Republic is being confirmed, the support by the United States for our integration effort is being confirmed.

However, at the same time it also expresses what I already mentioned a little while ago—that, in the spirit of friendship, the U.S. Government wants to share its views and worries about our developments with our officials, including the president, the prime minister, and deputies, as well as others.

What clearly emerges from this is that they want to tell us positive things, always emphasizing them in some way with pleasure and satisfaction, and that they are also prepared to draw our attention to those things that in their view might damage our interests.

[Correspondent] Just before leaving for the United States, you met, in the presence of a third person, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. Did this meeting provide any frame of reference for your visit to the United States?

[Kovac] This could not be the case because this meeting concerned totally different issues; it was not convened to take place because of my visit to the United States. As you are well aware, my visit was agreed upon long before that.

[Correspondent] Yesterday you met the prime minister as well as parliament Speaker Ivan Gasparovic once again. Is this meeting going to influence in any way relations between the parliament, the castle, and the government?

[Kovac] I think that this might (provide) for comprehensive and thorough information about our policies. The fact that this information is provided by the president of the Republic should not in any way—either a positive or a negative way—influence relations with the president.

[Correspondent] What reaction do you expect to this letter [the report on his talks in the United States that Kovac handed over during his meeting with Meciar and Gasparovic]?

[Kovac] I assume that the prime minister would correct the original view he has based on incomplete information provided by Radiozurnal and that he might show interest in a closer discussion of these questions.

[Correspondent] Have you agreed to meet again?

[Kovac] We have not agreed on our next meeting, but such a meeting can take place at any time, on the initiative of the speaker of the National Council or the prime minister, or on my initiative.

Criticizes Sending Note to U.S.

AU1808120995 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 17 Aug 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Slovak President Michal Kovac by Marian Lesko in Bratislava on 16 August: "Note to the Government of the United States Really Is a Faux Pas"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A few hours before his meeting yesterday with the parliament chairman and the Slovak prime minister, Michal Kovac granted an exclusive interview to our daily. The first question concerned precisely his coming talks with Ivan Gasparovic and Vladimir Meciar.

[Lesko] Mr. President, what do you expect of this meeting and what purpose does it serve, from your point of view?

[Kovac] I will submit to the National Council chairman and the prime minister a detailed report on my trip to the United States and, in particular, on the talks I held there. I expect that both constitutional officials will form a comprehensive and authentic picture of the course of my meetings. I believe that the far-reaching conclusions about them drawn so far have been based on incomplete information—my interview for Slovak Radio's Radio Journal and the partial transcript made available to the government by Ambassador Lichardus. In my opinion, this could not provide a complete picture of the overall contents of the talks and the positions I upheld at them.

[Lesko] What will be your further steps in this matter?

[Kovac] I suppose that the prime minister and the parliament chairman will study my report thoroughly. I will decide what to do next according to their reaction.

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[Lesko] Mr. President, you were playing two different roles in this "American" affair, as it were. The role of the main protagonist and the role of an outside observer, as you were monitoring Slovak reactions from abroad. Could you assess the domestic response from the viewpoint of an outside observer?

[Kovac] First of all, many reactions seemed to me to be rash and inadequate. Surely it is legitimate to reflect on whether I was right in providing the first important information about the contents of my talks to the radio or whether I should have waited until I returned to Slovakia. I proceeded from the realization, however, that the U.S. representatives' standpoints concerned not only our government, but also the country as a whole and its citizens. The citizen has the right to know how Slovakia is being assessed by those whose opinion is recognized in the United States as being that of authorities and responsible experts. The conclusions that have been drawn on the basis of the radio interview—that I "complained," that I "attacked" someone, that we travel abroad to "tell nonsense" about each other—are unfounded and divert attention from that which matters most: the content of the information, the gist of the matter. I did not make up anything, I was only trying to communicate faithfully a very important part of my talks, information that I obtained from representatives of important U.S. Administration departments: the Pentagon, the Department of State, and the White House adviser. I believe that the decision of our government to send a note to the U.S. Government on the basis of just one radio interview with the president and partial information imparted by an ambassador is a faux pas [allusion to Vladimir Meciar's statement that President Kovac's comments on his U.S. visit amounted to a "faux pas"]. That really is a faux pas! In my opinion, the government should have waited for official information and only then decided to take this step, if it really considered it necessary.

(In tomorrow's issue we will publish a more extensive interview with Michal Kovac, dealing not only with his trip to the United States, but also with his assessment of the overall political situation in Slovakia).

Ministry on Reply to Note

LD1708173995 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 17 Aug 95

[Interview with Jozef Sestak, Slovak Foreign Ministry state secretary, by Magda Pospisilova; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Pospisilova] The contents of our Foreign Ministry note to the United States basically included the question whether the United States has changed its attitude toward the Slovak Republic. What was the reply from the U.S. Embassy?

[Sestak] We respect the view or the request of the U.S. side not to publish the note. Of course, it would not be right if I did not confirm that the note has come. The note has come. I have no right at the moment to quote the note or to characterize it in detail. I can only tell our public, with full responsibility, that the note is positive, that the United States supports the positive development in the Slovak Republic, and the note, which we are particularly pleased about, confirms yet again the mutual respect between our two states and the fact that our interstate and intergovernmental relations are of high quality, are good and positive. The note confirms the fact that the U.S. Government is prepared to cooperate. It is cooperating with the democratically elected representatives of Slovakia.

[Pospisilova] Does this mean that, as usual, you will not publish the note or the reply.

[Sestak] I do not assume that we will publish the note.

[Pospisilova] According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, Bonn and Washington intensified the warning that the steps of the current Slovak Government will prevent our country from entering NATO and the European Union. How would you assess this critical article by the U.S. daily aimed at the current government?

[Sestak] THE NEW YORK TIMES article is a compilation of not only various facts, but also half-truths. It is a compilation that we reject fundamentally. This article does not correspond to reality. I do not even agree that Bonn and Washington intensified their warnings because this simply is not so. On the contrary, we have a very positive dialogue with both Washington and Bonn. I am not saying cliches; I can document it with concrete acts, agreements, and treaties. For example, I am going on a very important working trip to Bonn next week, where we shall talk about a number of concrete issues, including compensation to Nazi victims. I cannot agree with the article in THE NEW YORK TIMES. I have at my disposal a very prompt reaction of my U.S. partners, who do not identify with either the timing or the contents of this article.

[Pospisilova] Some political observers and politicians on our scene think that the report of Ambassador Branislav Lichardus [Slovak ambassador to the United States] basically confirmed the information given to Radiozurnal by President Michal Kovac. How would you explain this dual understanding of the matter?

[Sestak] It is not a task of the state secretary to comment on the statements, judgments, and views of the individual political parties. I would not like to

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return to these questions. I think enough facts have been published about this matter and that whoever wants to make conclusions by comparing various statements can form his or her own opinion.

[Pospisilova] It is not usual in diplomacy to publish the contents of the talks of constitutional officials as our Foreign Ministry has done. It was an internal document of the ministry. Will you continue this trend?

[Sestak] It is not a trend. It was an actual situation to which the government decided to react the way it did. There is a fundamental difference between publishing something that belongs to me, of which I am the owner, on the one hand, and something that does not belong to me, on the other. In the first case, the Foreign Ministry has the full right to decide what, when, and how to publish from its documents. It is another thing when various materials gained illegally appear on the tables of various editorial boards and institutions and are published with a certain aim. That is a completely different situation.

[Pospisilova] At the same time, the British confirmed that it could not have leaked from their side. Could the leak of these materials have come from our Foreign Ministry?

[Sestak] Our spokesman has issued a statement about it, and our appropriate technical organizational structures are discussing this matter. What I can say about the case of publishing the conversation with our minister is, first, that, if it was illegally published, it is very sad that things are being taken out of context and reaction from our side is not being shown. Second, since this did occur I can tell you that there was a continuation of the dialogue with the British side. We would rather not publish or incite this matter, but we did interpret certain reservations to the British Embassy.

[Pospisilova] I shall return to the U.S. case. U.S. policy experts say that the U.S. president's adviser is considerably closer to the head of state than a government member. I consider, therefore, a certain faux pas in your expression as a career diplomat that a third-class official—an adviser to the U.S. president—was involved.

[Sestak] I can only smile at this, naturally. It is because after six years of work in the United States, in Washington, the public should believe that I know something about it. Second, I have not said anything of the sort in the past three days. I only said that, in comparison with the post of the president, relatively low-ranking employees, state officials of the administration, were involved. I insist on this. As to the National Security Council, the adviser to the president sounds very nice, but we are talking about an advisory body of the U.S. president. I hold them in high esteem, by the way—Mr. Dan Fried, for example. I am in personal correspondence with him, we know each other, and he conveyed sincere greetings to me today via our ambassador, and I will reply to him soon too. But the fact remains that he is functionally third in the advisory body to the president. So I am sorry if the public is being misled. This is what the facts are.

Commentary Disparages Giving U.S. Award to Kovac

AU1708195595 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 11 Aug 95 p 3

[Commentary by Juraj Fuchs: "With M. Kovac Toward a Banana Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Chicago is better known for its gangland than for its products or culture. Gangsterism, a product of the "ideology" of organized crime, and violence have spread from there to the rest of the world. Unfortunately, successfully. They were given a boost during prohibition. Chicago, understandably, also has another face: skyscrapers, modern functionalist architecture, industry (slaughterhouses immortalized by Sinclair), a university...and a bar association. It gave Michal Kovac an award for "building a legal state."

Slovakia, shocked and outraged by M. Kovac, is to pay high legal fees for this award to "selfless" lawyer-businessmen. They include a representative of the Percheron company, which is intimately linked economically to our senior constitutional official and his family. The company wants to privatize assets worth billions in our country—first and foremost, the gas industry, with its net profit of 17 billion per annum.

I do not know if Chicago lawyers have a good name in the United States. But I do know that, when they read the papers, they do not look for reports about Slovakia. The majority of these, apparently, 12,000 lawyers—due also to our fault—know almost nothing about Slovakia. This is also true of the administration's third team in Washington, the team that was at the working lunch with M. Kovac. And, although they know almost nothing about us, they are concerned about our democracy, they are alarmed by developments in our country, and so on. You already know these phrases. A country's lawyers and administrators are distinguished by their logic. In this case, it is missing. M. Kovac immediately depreciated and disparaged the award for building a legal state. He took the expressions of concern and alarm about our democracy as ready proof of guilt, a verdict he would convey to the prime minister, the government, parliament, and so on. The collective guilt of Slovaks

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again. Now from the other end. M. Kovac will come to parliament with a thick skin because it expressed no confidence in him. But he is foisting himself on it, he is defiling it as the "builder of a legal state."

The president's constitutional and ethical duty is to defend his state. M. Kovac did not even do this abroad, and this was not the first time. Our young state needs protection from the authors of catastrophic scenarios forecasting its collapse, its being brought to its knees in a mere three months. The Slovak Republic has not become extinct. It will not become extinct! These same authors of catastrophic scenarios are now creating scenarios for concern, alarm, an authoritarian regime, and so on. They have undemocratically removed Vladimir Meciar from government twice. He responded by democratic means. A man desiring an authoritarian regime and a dictatorship would not have allowed himself to be removed by a parliamentary putsch. Yet, they are again planning to remove him undemocratically with the assistance of the "builder of a legal state" and his privatization friends across the ocean. He is an obstacle to them in the privatization of national property worth billions.

It is striking that the Chicago lawyers and the administration in Washington have shown no interest in the past of the *nomenklatura* communist M. Kovac, who bolstered F. Castro's unlawful dictatorial regime in Cuba, or even in how, under totalitarianism, he faithfully served the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and all of its bodies in London as the deputy director of Zivnobanka. The Americans, according to M. Kovac, know everything about us. It is interesting that they do not know that, three years ago, after the resignation of V. Havel, when M. Kovac was the most senior constitutional official in the CSFR, he said: "George Soros is a Hungarian Jew." Only a "builder of a legal state" in the Chicago sense could express himself in this way. Perhaps for some U.S. lawyers the lynching of a black man and his beating by the police—as happened recently in the United States—is also an element of building a "legal state."

M. Kovac has retained the thinking of totalitarianism. He has merely changed his team colors. Once he was used to everything being approved in Moscow. Now he is suffering from the illusion that we have to have everything we do (mainly privatization) approved in Chicago, Washington, or Atlanta (note this plurality), otherwise we will not experience the "happy tomorrows of a banana republic."

SNS's Slota Highlights 'Dangers' Facing Republic

AU1708193895 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 16 Aug 95 pp 1, 4

[Interview with SNS Chairman Jan Slota by Nora Sliskova; place and date not given: "We Want To Warn of the Dangers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak National Party [SNS] is often accused of radicalizing Slovak policy. The party's recent activities, in particular, have aroused public attention, which is why we asked SNS Chairman Jan Slota for an interview.

[Sliskova] It is said that the SNS is losing political ground and that its present initiatives are aimed at attracting the public's attention and gaining voters' support....

[Slota] I am sure that this is what the opposition claims. We do not know whether the opposition parties are gaining political ground, which they doubt in connection with our party. When we come out with a certain assertion or conviction, we are not doing so in order to gain voters' support. This is not even necessary because the elections will be three years from now. The aim of our statements is to alert our society to certain dangers and pitfalls confronting it.

[Sliskova] The SNS intends to initiate the passage of a law on the protection of the Republic, it is the author of the idea of establishing a home guard, and it has filed charges against politicians of the Hungarian coalition and the Soros Foundation. Do you feel that Slovakia is threatened by an external or internal enemy?

[Slota] I am, of course, convinced that this problem exists and is highly relevant. When someone refuses to see the activities of the representatives of the Hungarian parties and the ends to which they lead, he is either deaf or blind or does not want to see and hear. The SNS is not in such a position, and it was also for this reason that it recently drafted a proposal to amend the Penal Code. Had this amendment been passed, we would no longer have any problems with a certain group of people who permanently discredit and damage Slovakia.

[Sliskova] You have mentioned Hungarian politicians. Do you have in mind anyone besides them?

[Slota] There are also some other high-level representatives in Slovak politics, for example. They very often speak in a manner that has nothing in common with a positive attitude toward the state. They could help spread Slovakia's good name, which is reflected also in economic results, but the exact opposite is the case. Personally, I am of the opinion that there are plenty of people who damage the interests of this Republic and

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that this amendment is more than relevant. As regards the home guard, I would not link the issue to our being endangered. All states maintaining an army reckon on the possibility of a threat; otherwise they would not build up an army. I see no reason for Slovakia to be different in this regard.

[Sliskova] Certain indications of the West's dissatisfaction with developments in Slovakia are making themselves felt. Are you afraid of our country's isolation?

[Slota] I am not afraid of isolation because Slovakia and its government are not doing anything that would run counter to the generally accepted norms in Europe or the world at large. When someone wishes to emphasize this aspect, by all means let him take a look at the problems in Germany, France, and such. When analyzing these problems, we can see that Slovakia is substantially better off. As for President Michal Kovac's recent statement [about U.S. officials' apprehension at Slovakia's lagging behind other Central European countries in reforms and democracy], I feel that he has discredited his office by acting as messenger for representatives of the administration and by presenting an unofficial conversation as the official U.S. position. I want to express indignation at his course of action. Personally, I would have definitely proceeded otherwise.

[Sliskova] The SNS makes no secret of the fact that it will not support the ratification of the basic treaty between Slovakia and Hungary. Have you changed your position?

[Slota] We have already expressed our view, and the SNS never changes its positions. We believe that this treaty is of no contribution to Slovakia.

[Sliskova] Has the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] accepted your position?

[Slota] The HZDS has its own political view on this treaty. I think that the HZDS leadership fully accepts our decision.

Ethnic Minority Council Adopts 10 Recommendations

AU1708132095 Bratislava SME in Slovak 11 Aug 95 p 2

[Report by "(ch)": "An Extraordinary Session of the Government Council for Ethnic Minorities Adopted 10 Recommendations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The murder in Ziar nad Hronom, the new principles for the government's policy on Romanies, and the institute of a government plenipotentiary for dealing with citizens' problems that require special assistance were three of the issues discussed at yesterday's extraordinary session of the Slovak Government Council for Ethnic Minorities. Apart from the Council members, it was attended by the representatives of 12 Romany initiatives (at present, there are six registered Romany political parties and a total of 30 associations), local self-administrations, and state administration bodies from regions with a large number of Romany inhabitants. The Council adopted 10 recommendations, the aim of which is to prevent the spread of manifestations of violence and intolerance. Among other things, it is recommended to the mayors of towns and communities that they curb the spread of skinhead activities and demonstrations and incorporate Romanies into commissions of municipal bodies and local security units. At the same time, the Council recommended that the issue of skinheads, their activities, and everything associated with them be discussed within the Government Council for Combating Antisocial Activity. According to Jozef Kalman, the Council's chairman, the new principles for the government's policy on Romanies should be drafted soon. Two declarations were also adopted at yesterday's session, which condemned the violent crime committed in Ziar nad Hronom on 21 July. The declaration from the extraordinary session appeals to the representatives of the mass media, the clergy of the individual churches, teachers in all grades of schools, and youth organizations to orient their activity toward alleviating interethnic tensions in society. According to Vincent Danihel, deputy chairman of the Slovak Helsinki Committee and a representative of the Romany intelligentsia in Slovakia, the Romanies who took part in the Council session represent 400,000 to 450,000 Romanies.

Air Corps Relocated From Malacky to Kosice

AU1708195695 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 12 Aug 95 p 4

[Report by "(mil)": "Army MiG's Are Flying Over Kosice With Restrictions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kosice—Since 4 August, apart from the roar of city traffic, the roar of MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft engines has also been blighting the lives of the people of Kosice. We have found out from a source that does not wish to be named that "the commander of the 3d Air Force and Air Defense Corps has decided to close Malacky Airfield. The entire Air Force regiment has been redeployed to Kosice. Maintenance of the runway and operating equipment is under way in Malacky. The pilots are continuing to train in Kosice so that they do not lose their flying skills. At the same time, this training is taking place with restrictions: They fly only at sonic speeds and for only three hours per day. At the same time, maximum

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consideration is given to the city's inhabitants, and the pilots fulfill their tasks in the outlying areas of the region." Our informant was unable to say how long the Malacky pilots will use the Kosice airfield. Obviously, everything depends on the reconstruction of the airfield at their home base.

'Decisive' Package of Slovnaft Shares To Be Sold

AU1708132695

[FBIS Editorial Report] Bratislava SME in Slovak on 15 and 16 August publishes reports on the decision of the National Property Fund (FNM) Presidium to sell 39 percent of shares of the Slovnaft oil refinery to a shareholding company (a.s.) set up by 19 members of Slovnaft's top management. The FNM decision is also subject of a Vladimir Tvaroska commentary in Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 16 August, which emphasizes its lack of "transparency" and "fairness."

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 15 August on page 2 carries a 400-word report by "b" entitled "Slovnaft Will Be Privatized by Employees." The report states that "the FNM Presidium approved a number of proposals for the issuance of privatization decisions last week. Under one of the approved proposals, 39 percent of the shares of Slovnaft a.s. are to be purchased by Slovintegra a.s. The approved purchase price is 6,422,892,000 korunas [Sk] and the first installment Sk100 million." The report quotes Slovnaft spokesman Lubomir Zitnan as having "confirmed" to a SME correspondent that Slovintegra a.s. was established by "Slovnaft employees." The SME report points out that the FNM Presidium's decision runs counter to the position of Economy Minister Jan Ducky, who advocated the shelving of the privatization of power and gas companies for three to five years. SME also recalls that, following President Kovac's talks with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yarov in August 1994, press reports indicated that Slovnaft shares would be traded for shares in Russian oil industry companies.

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 16 August on page 2 carries a 400-word report by "b," entitled "Slovintegra, Which Is To Become Owner of 39 Percent of Slovnaft Shares, Will Be an Employees' Shareholding Company." The report provides further details on the FNM-approved transaction. It states that Slovintegra a.s. was established in April 1995 by "19 members of the Slovnaft top management," with the aim of participating in the privatization of Slovnaft and that, according to the company's statutes, "all employees of the Slovnaft a.s. can become Slovintegra shareholders by subscribing to new shares of this employees' a.s." According to SME, by purchasing 39 percent of Slovnaft shares, Slovintegra will "obtain the largest package of Slovnaft shares, which will allow it to block decisions by any other shareholder." Following the sale of 39 percent of Slovnaft shares to Slovintegra, the FNM will reportedly retain a 27-percent stake in the petrochemical company. The SME report also recalls that Slovnaft recently increased its capital by issuing Sk3.3 billion worth of new shares, most of which were purchased by Slovak banks because, "with the exception of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, no foreign investor showed an interest in the shares."

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 16 August on page 4 carries a 700-word commentary by Vladimir Tvaroska entitled "FNM: Machine for Multimillionaires." Tvaroska opens the commentary by saying: "The fears that the pace of privatization would slow down after the present government came to power have proved to be unnecessary and even ludicrous. The FNM is privatizing at a speed that makes one feel dizzy. At the last meeting of its Presidium, more than Sk11 billion worth of property was sold. Hence, it is not the speed of privatization that is problematic. However, one can scarcely speak about the transparency or fairness of the privatization process.

"The FNM is selling decisive stakes in companies such as Slovnaft, Duslo Sala, Skloplast Trnava, and many others without even making public basic information on the buyers. Likewise, it is unknown how many years they will be paying off the purchase price and on the basis of which criteria precisely they were chosen as buyers."

Tvaroska observes that, while the government declares its intention to sell property primarily to shareholding companies established by employees, in reality "only the top management is often hidden under their cloak. The recent sale of almost 40 percent of Slovnaft shares worth almost Sk6.5 billion can serve as an example. They were purchased by Slovintegra, an employees' a.s. whose shareholders consist of just 19 people. All other Slovnaft employees will probably be able to join them in the near future, but their combined share in Slovintegra will not exceed 49 percent. The top managers will then own more than 3 million Slovnaft shares, the remaining 5,200 Slovnaft employees somewhat fewer. Irrespective of whether they are doing a good job, the managers will become multimillionaires in a few years." "What did they do to deserve this?" Tvaroska asks.

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Warning of 'Mass Exodus' of Hungarians From Serbia

AU1808095495 Hamburg DIE WOCHE in German 18 Aug 95 p 27

[Article by Gabor Kszely: "Before the Exodus"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian border guards are on the alert again: At the Szeged-Horgos border checkpoint, Hungarian civilians from the FRY are asking for asylum in their motherland. They are reporting the imminent mass exodus of their compatriots; 500,000 ethnic Hungarians live in the multiracial province of Vojvodina, which is north of Belgrade and is administered by Serbia.

As early as in 1991, during the Croatian war, the military authorities of former Yugoslavia forcibly recruited young men, and Serbian guerrilla units that were used as auxiliary troops of the police drove thousands of Hungarian civilians across the border in large-scale "security actions." To the end, the government in Belgrade claimed at that time that it did not intend to treat the Hungarians as hostages—and that the local authorities were responsible for trespassing.

Now emergency accommodations are again being prepared, since the two largest reception camps are already overcrowded with about 7,000 expellees each. The first new arrivals report on harassment by the police and Serbian guerrillas. The authorities are temporarily housing Serbian refugees from Krajina and Bihac in local houses and obliging them to provide for their keep.

Those who refuse expose themselves to the accusation of being "allied with the enemy." About 800 Croats have already been expelled from Vojvodina on these grounds. A similar fate is imminent for the Hungarians.

The forced recruitments among the Hungarian population started as early as three months ago. All the Hungarian Government's efforts to broach the issue have had no response. Belgrade has not even reacted to the Hungarian offer to hold a conference in Budapest to deal with the crisis.

The FRY Government is especially irritated by the presence of NATO AWACS reconnaissance planes in Hungarian air space. In 1992 Budapest opened the sky over Hungary to the Alliance's reconnaissance planes so it could monitor events in the war in the south Slav area, but NATO's security guarantees for Hungary are limited. They only provide for the protection of the units of the international community.

Three weeks ago, NATO Secretary General Claes explicitly rejected an extension of the promises to possible "locally limited incidents," for example, in the case of border violations.

Budapest Government authorities are doing their best to conceal their bitterness. However, they repeatedly and emphatically point out that Hungary is not a neutral observer of the crisis in former Yugoslavia. What is more, it sees itself in the role of a frontline state that could quickly be affected if tensions get worse.

Belgrade Protection of Vojvodina Hungarians Expected

LD1708195695 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 17 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian Government expects Belgrade to take immediate measures for the protection of Hungarians living in Vojvodina [Vajdasg].

The Horn cabinet adopted a statement asking the Yugoslav and Serb Governments to prevent the arbitrary settlement of refugees, and spontaneous or organized actions aimed at driving out the Hungarians of Vojvodina.

UN Requests Suspension of Gas Delivery to Bosnia

LD1808101295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0600 GMT 18 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The UN Sanctions Committee asked Hungary not to allow Russian gas supplies to go through the country. Gas does not reach Sarajevo because the Serbs are tapping the pipeline. A Foreign Ministry official confirmed the request for suspension of gas deliveries.

Yugoslav, Hungarian Army Chiefs Exchange Letters

AU1708144595 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 16 Aug 95 p 1

[Correspondents' report: "Hungarian-Yugoslav Military Exchange of Letters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] NEPSZABADSAG has learned from diplomatic sources in Belgrade that the Yugoslav Army chief of staff and the Hungarian Army exchanged letters recently. According to our information, in his letter sent to Sandor Nemeth, Hungarian Army chief of staff, [Momcilo] Perisic, Yugoslav Army chief of staff, stressed that the military policy situation deteriorated in the wake of recent events, and military tension shifted to the area of South Baranya and Eastern Slavonia. Perisic wrote to his Hungarian counterpart that Belgrade understands the Hungarian measures in connection with this.

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We also learned that Belgrade expressed its satisfaction over Sandor Nemeth's prompt answer. They think that, in harmony with the previous official government statements, the Hungarian answer underlines Hungary's full military neutrality and the fact that Budapest does not favor any participant in the current conflict.

Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti spoke about the Hungarian military situation at a conference outlining the tasks of the Hungarian Army. He declared that certain prevention measures became necessary, but no regrouping of troops whatsoever has taken place, and the Hungarian Army has not been put on high alert.

Hungarian Army Commander Janos Deak also spoke at the aforementioned conference and, speaking about the situation along Hungary's southern borders, he said Hungary's airspace has not been violated by Yugoslavia recently, and both countries observe the agreement on banning flights within a 10-km line along both sides of the border. Janos Deak told us that, if asked, the Hungarian Army is ready to guarantee the marching of UN troops through Hungary if the United Nations or the individual countries decide to end the mandate of this contingent.

The goal of the Hungarian Army is to make sure that Hungary remains outside this conflict, and we do not commit ourselves to any of the warring sides, Janos Deak pointed out. If necessary, the Hungarian Army will provide aid to the Border Police, just as has been the case until now.

Nikolits: This Republic No Paradise for Spies

AU1708195895 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 14 Aug 95 pp 1, 9

[Interview with Istvan Nikolits, minister without portfolio in charge of civilian secret services, by Peter Vajda and Imre Bednarik; place and date not given: "This Country Is Not a Paradise for Spies"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [NEPSZABADSAG] Is Hungary a paradise for spies today?

[Nikolits] I would not say that, but I would not dare say that we are completely isolated either. I would not compare today's conditions with the conditions prevailing in Hungary in the forties and in Vienna in the eighties. We must, however, acknowledge the fact that the most varied "roads" can be found in Hungary.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Do you mean by this that we are not the main target?

[Nikolits] I am sure that there are many "inquiring people" in Hungary, but they are not necessarily trying to spy on us. There are special reasons for their preference to keep residence in Hungary, but it is also certain that Hungary is not their main observation target.

[NEPSZABADSAG] But we should be aware of them, should we not?

[Nikolits] We not only should, but we also must, be aware of them. If we are the hosts, we should at least know what is going on in this country.

[NEPSZABADSAG] From a certain point of view, you are the best informed person in the government. Did you have advanced knowledge of what would happen in Croatia?

[Nikolits] Yes, I did.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Do you fear that the military action might also spread into the vicinity of our southern borders?

[Nikolits] This is a constant issue for the government. Today, I do not see any logically foreseeable event that could directly threaten our southern borders. However, the war in the former Yugoslavia has already produced a lot of unforeseeable events. We must also prepare for the most unexpected events, too. We must also take into account the fact that an increasing number of refugees will arrive into Hungary as a result of the Croatian military action.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Southern Slavs or Hungarians?

[Nikolits] This depends on the direction the Serbs fleeing from the Krajinas through Bosnia are taking and the places they settle down. We hope that there will not be a new wave of refugees in Hungary and that the ethnic composition of the refugees coming to Hungary basically will not change. So the Hungarians in Vojvodina will continue to be able to live in their homes. [passage omitted]

[NEPSZABADSAG] There have already been reports that counterintelligence, the constitution-protection directorate, and the technical department that also serves the police are all part of the civilian secret services. Have you now reorganized the services thoroughly?

[Nikolits] We have modified the focus. On the one hand, we strengthened our economic-protection department. On the other hand, we increased our presence in the counties along our southern and eastern borders. [passage omitted]

[NEPSZABADSAG] Recently, our editors came across newspapers that propagate the fallow ideas of extremist organizations. How long can we tolerate the activity of such extremist organizations?

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[Nikolits] Naturally, we must deal with this phenomenon, but we should only take steps against them if they violate the democratic order. There is no such danger in Hungary today.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Are you aware of the fact that these organizations are also supported financially?

[Nikolits] Yes, we are.

[NEPSZABADSAG] In your opinion, does the active core of extremist organizations number hundreds or thousands of people?

[Nikolits] Let us stick to the first figure. [passage omitted]

Ministry Issues Data on Economic Developments

AU1708193995 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 15 Aug 95 p 7

[MTI report: "A Decreasing Deterioration in the Economic Balance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Economic figures for the first quarter of 1995 show an increase in the trade deficit over the previous two years followed by a considerable slow down. Following the decisions of the Hungarian Government in March this year, the increase in imports slowed down, and the deficit in the balance of payments, the increase in the budget deficit, and the monthly inflation rate all fell. Production increased, primarily based on exports and on demand for investment. All this appears in the Finance Ministry's August report on economic developments in 1995.

According to the report, the balance of payments deficit, which reached $2 billion at the end of May, shows that financing the state budget deficit and entrepreneurial activity requires considerably more resources than can be provided by domestic savings. The budget deficit in itself exceeds the value of savings, so the enterprises' need for resources is seriously limited on the domestic financial market. The steady increase in interest rates on financial market credits in the first half of 1995 and the increasing direct foreign credits taken up by various companies show this. The state administration's demand for financial resources derives from a budget deficit that is bigger than planned and a major deficit in social security funds, namely 27 billion forints [FT] at midyear. The stabilization measures declared in March were already slowing down the growth in the central budget deficit in the second quarter of 1995, and the government decisions taken in July will also contribute to this improvement. The Ft146-billion budget deficit in the first quarter only increased to Ft192 billion by the end of June. According to the report, the fact that we cannot count on privatization income before the end of this year hinders the financing of the budget deficit in the middle of the year. The government's social security agreement offers hope that there will be only a basic Ft5-billion deficit by the end of this year.

Inflation accelerated considerably, partly because of central measures such as energy price increases, forint devaluation, customs supplements, and partly because of market movements. Production prices increased by 25 percent between January and May this year, compared with the same period last year, while consumer prices increased by 27 percent in the first half of 1995. However, the monthly changes in prices slowed down in the second quarter, and this trend may continue in the future through a strict monetary policy and the declared exchange rate policy.

According to the report, the stabilization measures have not yet led to major changes in the real processes of the economy. The increase in imports slowed down in the second quarter of 1995, and the gap between imports and exports is narrowing, but the expected rapid increase in exports has not yet begun. The fact that the recent stabilization program did not halt economic growth gives hope for increasing exports. After the 4-percent increase in 1993 and the 9-percent increase in 1994, industrial production increased by 10 percent in the first five months of 1995, compared with the same period in 1994. Domestic sales increased by 3 percent and export-oriented sales by 28 percent.

According to the report, one can expect an accelerated effect of the stabilization measures in the second half of 1995. However, this will also lead to a smaller improvement in the economic balance than expected. The current balance of payments deficit is expected to reach $3 billion and the annual level of consumer price increases is expected to top 28-29 percent. At the same time, the clearly deteriorating trend of the trade balance characteristic of recent years might be halted: Compared to GDP, the balance of payments deficit might fall to 7 percent, as opposed to 9-10 percent in 1994, or 6-6.5 percent, as opposed to 8 percent, without taking privatization income into account. Price increases are expected to remain moderate and the increase in economic activity will depend on the increase in investment and exports.

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SZDSZ Head on Government Ministers, Policies

95CH0324A Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian 11 Jul 95 pp 8-9

[Interview with SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Peto by Andras Banki; place and date not given: "Protected Ministers—Andras Banki Talks With Ivan Peto"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"There is no general rule as to when a minister must be let go, and there is no minister who must be retained by all means," said Ivan Peto to our correspondent. We also asked the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] chairman why the public consent is that, in its second year, the socialist-liberal Horn administration has not proven to be any better than the Antall and Boross administrations we had suffered through.*

[Banki] In view of the Constitutional Court ruling and the failure—and loss of prestige—of the administration and the government parties, what conclusions are drawn by the SZDSZ?

[Peto] We consider the Constitutional Court ruling as a given. Of course, everyone has his own opinion, but we would like to avoid the mistake of, say, the smallholders party, which questions the constitutionality of any Constitutional Court ruling that is not to its liking. The package as a whole and the process itself were not deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. It rejected the opposition's claim to this effect. Its rulings were unprecedented rulings, but it was to be expected that the justices would adhere to their earlier views concerning personal ID numbers. I think, therefore, that one must not necessarily look for personal consequences in this case. I can reiterate myself by saying that Hungary's economic interests and the maintenance of our solvency may come into conflict with constitutionality, and constitutionality takes priority in such instances. Now the Constitutional Court went a step further in interpreting the Constitution, further limiting the authority of any given government.

[Banki] How long are you going to keep those ministers in office whose presence has become a burden for the administration? According to certain analysts, keeping Lajos Bokros in office is tantamount to accepting a loss of moral credibility. Gabor Fodor does not have the cultural elite's trust anymore, and the administration's failures in the area of public law make Pal Vastagh's fitness to be minister of justice questionable as well.

[Peto] There is no general rule as to when a minister must be let go. I have my own opinion on Lajos Bokros, and I think that he cannot be reproached on a moral basis. On the other hand, it may be questionable whether the way in which he responded to the attacks was politically wise. But what his attackers find irritating is not so much his personality but the economic policy he represents. I think the same is true in Gabor Fodor's case. In the case of the minister of justice, the question is whether it is the minister himself who is the legal expert who must swim against the current and recognize unconstitutionality from a distance or whether this is a task for his staff of experts. But I do not want to delve into this because it is a little different than the cases of Bokros and Fodor. However, it would be good to think about the consequences of Lajos Bokros's departure. I think that it would result in Hungary's loss of financial credibility. Where does it lead if a finance minister is worn out every six months because, although their economic policies are hard for the citizens at present, they offer a chance—which is also supported by Hungary's international acceptance—to stabilize Hungary's financial situation? The point here is not that if a minister is criticized, the simplest thing to do is to let him go. For a new minister would come, and if he would follow the same economic policy—he could hardly do otherwise—he would become subject to the same criticisms again.

[Banki] It is to Bokros's credit that his policies are supported by the financial and business circles. This cannot be said of Gabor Fodor, whose activity is met with an apparent antagonism in certain circles of the cultural intelligentsia.

[Peto] Again, the issue here is not Fodor's personality but rather the specific views of some of the cultural intelligentsia. The issue is that he thinks that acquired rights are privileges. He turns fiercely against anyone who dares touch these in the name of decreasing the role of the state or anyone who says that the state cannot provide as much money for culture as before or that it will appropriate the funds differently than before.

[Banki] Gabor Fodor's 12 points and his sudden post-silence activity are an indirect testimony that the criticisms against him were not unfounded. Some people say that he is running after his chair.

[Peto] I see this differently. Next year's budget is being prepared under different conditions than the restrictive package of March was prepared. This could be opposed only by a technique similar to that of Pal Kovacs. And if Gabor Fodor also resigns as a result of stifling education and culture, then another minister will come and continue to stifle. The situation in preparing next year's budget is different: the minister may determine the limit of restrictions he can accept. [Fodor's] 12 points contains preferences and financing techniques which could indeed save the endangered values of our culture.

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[Banki] Can this be summarized by saying that the SZDSZ continues to insist on [keeping] Lajos Bokros and Gabor Fodor?

[Peto] There is no minister who must be retained by all means. But I have not yet heard any serious argument for replacing them. For dissatisfaction with their restrictive policies are not serious arguments for me.

In the Form of a Statement

[Banki] In determining the economic policy in connection with the preparation of next year's budget and in connection with the issue of stability versus development, SZDSZ representatives prefer development and accept an increased budget deficit as its price. This is in contradiction with your proclaimed program, on which Bokros's stabilization program was also built, and is at the same time almost identical with the therapy recommended by the opposition. What happened? Have you changed direction?

[Peto] This would be true if this were our view. But it is not. The SZDSZ has always proclaimed that the possibilities for development must also be considered in thinking about stabilization, but we have never questioned stabilization's priority.

[Banki] I beg your pardon, that is what was in the paper...

[Peto] I know. Well, this is what we proclaimed, and this is the issue at present: is it possible to reduce the 1996 budget's 6-percent deficit to 3 percent of GDP in accordance with the IMF's recommendation? Or would this be a burden that our country could not carry without undermining political stability? The latter has been the view of not only the SZDSZ but also that of the prime minister—and not in the form of a question but in that of a statement. This is why it would be good to consider the possibility of a larger deficit, which would still be a drastic decrease as compared to this year's. Our argument is that the difference of a hundred billion between the 3 percent and a possible 4.5 percent would be used for reforming the state budget (which would cost many billions), and not for financing consumption. What we say, then, is that it is in our country's interest to make such an agreement with the IMF, in the knowledge that, in the absence of such an agreement, it may not be possible to finance the running of our country. We also know that decisions that jeopardize Hungary's solvency are against the interests of the Hungarian people.

[Banki] It seems, then, that this was a misunderstanding. But why is it that the free democrats seem, from the outside, to become increasingly unpredictable and that their loyalty to the government seems to clash with their principles? The issue of personal ID numbers must be especially painful for the SZDSZ. The SZDSZ was still an opposition party when it extolled it in the name of liberalism, liberty rights, and protecting the private sphere, and then the Constitutional Court ruled that it was unconstitutional. And now the free-democrat minister of the interior was pushing—and the SZDSZ representatives voted for—this issue, but the Constitutional Court adhered to its ruling.

[Peto] The question is, what is more important for the administration. Is it to shoulder several billions of extra expenditures by eliminating personal ID numbers...?

[Banki] This is not an issue of deliberation. It is its responsibility.

[Peto] This administration's reasoning, just as that of the previous ones, was that since there are so many expenditures, is it really that urgent to abolish personal ID numbers and replace them with a constitutionally acceptable register, at a cost of many billions? So, the point here is not that the administration is supporting an inhumane measure for some kind of arbitrary reason rather that there is a conflict between various humane considerations. I consider humane, not only the protection of human rights, but also the fact that the administration does not want to take away several billions from, say, social expenditures or regular local government subsidies to finance the abolition of personal ID numbers. For this reason, the administration's initiative was not to disregard the Constitutional Court's ruling but, in view of our budget and the billions needed for restructuring, to allow the use of personal ID numbers until 1999. The Constitutional Court stood fast, and now the government will be forced to look somewhere else for the money needed for issuing personal ID numbers. I repeat, this is an expenditure of about 15 billion.

Extremities

[Banki] Although the National Assembly approved Gyula Horn's response, in your statement you distanced yourself from the prime minister's statement, which was offensive to the opposition; indeed, you even condemned the prime minister for that.

[Peto] I cannot tell you anything new. When a coalition partner votes against the prime minister in an interpellation of a political character, it is formally considered a political mistrust, the consequence of which is government crisis. On the other hand, regardless of its substance, the prime minister's response to the interpellation was in itself acceptable. For we all know that every opposition party has certain connections with extreme right-wing parties outside of the National Assembly. One must not forget that the smallholders party

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helped the MIEP [Hungarian Justice and Life Party] to become member of the Budapest City Council and that, with the support of various groups ranging from the FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] to the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], the Pest County Council elected MIEP-affiliated Endre Csurka deputy chairman. The PEST MEGYEI HIRLAP was published under Christian Democrat Gyorgy Giczy's editorship. However, one cannot say that extreme articles in this newspaper—how should I say—were rare; certain government party politicians were called Mengele, for instance. So, these extensive connections can be compared with, say, the fact that extremist Le Pen is completely ignored by the French parliament's right wing. Thus, our problem was not that the prime minister dwelled on this issue, rather that he stated his view in a press release abroad, making generalizations and failing to differentiate. There was no organized action at the voting: everyone voted as they wished, and most SZDSZ representatives seemingly felt that the stakes were too high for casting a negative vote...

The Administration's First Year

[Banki] Then why did you condemn Gyula Horn?

[Peto] Because of the motive: the interview. And because this conflict could have been resolved in a more elegant fashion—had the prime minister responded in a letter to the opposition parties while he was in the United States.

[Banki] The free democrats always vote according to their conviction?

[Peto] It is one's personal decision in what one agrees with or does not agree with. We are careful, in accordance with the coalition agreement, to have our parliamentary representatives reach a two-thirds majority in support of government proposals. In more important political issues, we make this clear ahead of time and, if necessary, we try to convince each other. But this has not yet presented any special problem.

[Banki] What is the message in the fact that Jozsef Torgyan formed, so to speak, a shadow government and that the Independent Smallholders Party is already urging for the Horn administration's resignation and calling for special elections?

[Peto] There is no message in this for the SZDSZ but, hopefully, there is one for Hungarian society.

[Banki] And what is the message in the results of public surveys, in the increasing weight of the smallholders, and in the unpopularity of the government parties?

[Peto] They reveal that most voters, who distanced themselves from the two government parties, did not join the opposition parties. It is mostly the number of the undecided and nonpartisan voters that has increased, amounting at present to almost half of all eligible voters. The smallholders' success is relative; the actual number of their supporters is not any larger than it was at last year's elections.

[Banki] The socialist-liberal Horn administration will have its first anniversary on 15 July. The prime minister has said that the lessons learned in governing must be reflected upon. How would you evaluate this past year?

[Peto] I am not an advocate of anniversary inventories, and we have no intention of doing any such thing. Of course, we must always be aware of everything we have and have not done. We have always voiced our opinion loudly and publicly. Unfortunately, it is of little significance to repeat what we have already said many times, namely, that we have been lagging behind during the first eight or nine months, and that this was a mistake.

[Banki] What is the reason for the general opinion that this administration is not any better than the Antall or Boross administrations were?

[Peto] I think that this is a better administration because it deals with issues it must deal with. The results of international comparative studies have repeatedly shown that Hungarian society is skeptical and pessimistic. The question is, can any administration be popular in Hungary today?

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Dudakovic on Abdic, Joint Actions With Croats

AU1808094095 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Aug 95 p 6

[Report by Safet Hrnjica on news conference by General Atif Dudakovic, commander of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, in Bihac on 10 August: "Abdic Surrendered to the Croatian Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the news conference for foreign and local correspondents he gave on Thursday [10 August], Division General Atif Dudakovic confirmed the news that Fikret Abdic, his assistants, and some of his rebel troops surrendered to the Croatian Army somewhere on the newly liberated territory in the former Sector North. It is known that negotiations are being held on the outcome of Abdic's surrender, and that the negotiating parties are a delegation of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and a delegation representing Fikret Abdic. The delegation of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina consists of: Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Hasan Muratovic, minister in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government; and the ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Croatia, Kasim Trnka. In the rebel delegation there are: Fikret Abdic, Bozidar Sicel, and Irfan Saracevic. The negotiations are still going on, and their outcome is still unknown.

Answering numerous questions, Gen. Dudakovic pointed out that the Bosniak people in Una-Sana Canton had no fears that, after all that has been done, the influence of the Republic of Croatia on the western part of the Bosnian state will be so great as to harm the Croat and Bosniak people living there. As for the questions on the future activities of the 5th Corps and its joint activities with the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], Gen. Dudakovic said that the activities of the 5th Corps so far could be compared to a restless chick in an egg, trying all the time to break the shell. With time, the chick has grown and broken the shell, but the 5th Corps has remained restless. Restless to what degree—that will depend on the orders of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. In the last of the five actions it has taken, the 5th Corps managed to arm itself rather well, which has considerably changed the balance of power to the advantage of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and its allies. To the question of what would be best for the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Gen. Dudakovic said that the best thing for them would be to sign the Contact Group plan. And since that is not on the table any more, he said that it would be in the interest of the Serbian people if Karadzic, Mladic, Koljevic, and the rest of them emigrated to the Holy Mountain [Sveta Gora] in Greece, or somewhere in Russia or Serbia. At the end, he said that the time of myths about a Serbian general on horseback with a mace in his hands is gone. He said that this was the time of computers and of forces committed to democracy, and that the Serbs have nothing to say about that.

Commentaries View Silajdzic, Ruling Party Crisis

Split Daily Gives Background

AU1808080095 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Aug 95 p 6

[Commentary by Zdravka Soldic: "SDA Arrogance Is Over?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The resignation of Prime Minister Silajdzic has shaken the stability of the Bosnian-Herzegovinan political stage more than any other even since the first, and for the time being, the only democratic elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In order not to cause the collapse of the whole system of authority, at a marathon session of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was also attended by some other state officials, President Izetbegovic had to personally ask Prime Minister Silajdzic to withdraw his resignation. Izetbegovic was forced to make such a move because, otherwise, he also would have lost five members of the Presidency itself. Kljuic, Komsic, Pejanovic, Mijatovic, and Durakovic threatened to resign unless the reasons for the prime minister announcing his resignation were thoroughly considered. Thus, Silajdzic would have received support for his demands through a majority of votes, and his resignation would not have been accepted. Meanwhile, an agreement was reached by which Izetbegovic would ask Silajdzic to withdraw his resignation.

And why did the prime minister submit his resignation at all? Although there is speculation; that he does not agree with the Split Declaration, that is, that he does not support cooperation with the Croats, and that he has been blamed for the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa... we can state with certainty that Silajdzic submitted his resignation because he wanted, as he himself said, "that finally everybody does his own job in Bosnia-Herzegovina." Namely, for a long period of time, during which Prime Minister Silajdzic has issued frequent warnings, the Main Board of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] has been interfering in matters that come under the jurisdiction of the government. Whatever the SDA wants is carried out, regardless of whether it is constitutionally possible. For almost two years, therefore, a conflict has been smoldering in the SDA, particularly between Silajdzic and the Main Board of the SDA. Such a situation has created a fierce animosity between the president of the Presidency and

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the government, but also between the prime minister and many SDA members.

Last week, while everyone was waiting to see whether Silajdzic would withdraw his resignation, many problems within the party came to the surface, as well as the problem of who is who in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some people from the SDA either did not know or did not want to hide the conflict between Silajdzic and some SDA members, the conflict that has, so far, been kept secret. Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic and Former Deputy Prime Minister Edib Bukvic took part In a television show, to which Prime Minister Silajdzic was not invited, although his resignation was discussed. Everything those two said would be funny if Bosnia-Herzegovina was not i ch a tragic situation. Apart from pointing out on several occasions that individuals are not important, and that one person cannot gain world popularity on account of the suffering of one's own people, personal disagreements and impressions were also expressed.

"Can you imagine, he tells me that I speak bad Bosnian," Minister Sacirbegovic complained. The minister also complained that Silajdzic did not want to shake hands with him when he arrived in Sarajevo to take charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After this show, the citizens of Sarajevo are asking themselves with sadness, but also with irony, who represents them in the world? Meanwhile, Sacirbegovic's and Bukvic's statements have only been counterproductive. Having commented on that show, the citizens of Sarajevo expressed their support for the prime minister. The SDA media offensive against the prime minister has always emphasized that the SDA had capable men who could take his place and "who will not gather all the kudos for themselves." The SDA leaders have not managed to hide how much they minded Silajdzic's popularity and eminence in the country, as well as the credibility he enjoys in the world.

Silajdzic has had no opportunity to explain the reasons of his resignation to the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the state television network. When he wanted to be a guest on Radio and Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina to explain the motives for his resignation, the SDA Central Office insisted that the newly appointed member of the Presidency, Edhem Bicakcic, should participate in the show, allegedly to inform the public objectively. An embittered Silajdzic refused to accept that ultimatum, and the show was canceled. This is one more indicator of how the SDA has usurped the authorities in all spheres of society. If the laws of Bosnia-Herzegovina were implemented, the prime minister would appoint the director of the state television network, and it could not happen, as did happen eight months ago, that the director would threaten to relieve the prime minister of office. Also, the television network should have an editor in chief, instead of Director Omersoftic in charge. But it is not only the state television in question, but all other public enterprises. It has become common that only SDA members can be appointed as managers of those enterprises. It is known that the prime minister has opposed that, that he insisted on experts, not on obedient personnel, but his protests had no success, even after he resigned from the position of SDA vice president. From last weeks tempestuous events, one could see who had the support of the public, that is, what the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina want. The Main Board of the SDA, that is, President Izetbegovic himself, should think deeply about his conduct so far, as well as about his next moves. All day long, on all radio stations, citizens appealed to the prime minister to withdraw his resignation. All oppositional parties expressed their confidence in him and supported his demand to be given an explanation of what is whose responsibility in the state institutions.

The five members of the Presidency who are not SDA members finally made a decision upon something, since Izetbegovic, as the first among equals, earlier frequently usurped the function of the collective head of the state. At the Assembly session in Zenica the other day, he also introduced a semipresidential system regardless of the resistance of the opposition, as well as of the members of the Presidency.

In any case, it has turned out that Silajdzic is the only person who can and knows how to deal with the SDA and Izetbegovic. If Izetbegovic does not want a new crisis with the now significantly strengthened Silajdzic, the Constitution and law will finally have to be respected in Bosnia-Herzegovina or the collapse of the system and new elections—although there no conditions for them at all—will be inevitable.

Sarajevo Daily Backs Silajdzic

AU1808080895 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 6 Aug 95 p 2

[Commentary by Slavko Santic: "Pyrrhic Victory"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, as he himself stated, was not informed that a meeting of the Republican Assembly would be held, and when it would be held. As he happened to be in such an absurd situation, he could have calmly said that he did not know about the Assembly session in Zenica at all. The absurd, of course, has not yet assumed such a perfect form. The prime minister, of course, knew what was being prepared, so it can be assumed that he knew what he was supposed to do in that situation.

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Those who are prone to interpreting the prime minister's anger and outrage because of such behavior toward him as sheer vanity, ought to know that it was an example of unsurpassed political impudence and arrogance and primitive bureaucratic disrespect on the part of those who are in charge of procedural correctness in the organization of the latest meeting of the Assembly. But it is hard to believe that the prime minister was bypassed in such a way out of mere negligence and without the knowledge of those who are, at the moment and in the current hierarchy, more important and powerful than he is, or at least think so of themselves. In view of the continuous events about the prime minister, which have been impossible to conceal from the public at home and abroad, however, it could be expected for many reasons that he, an honorable man and respected politician as he is, would certainly make a move at the meeting in Zenica, at which many would express feigned surprise. Now there is no doubt that many went to Zenica knowing what would happen, and even desiring the prime minister's fall. Even laymen can see the many indicators that those people had their fingers in the pie.

The prime minister's written resignation (the real reasons are only being speculated about, but they will certainly be established quite soon) has brought to light a deep and at this moment very dangerous political crisis. In Zenica, the prime minister obviously did not have a choice if he wanted to preserve his own dignity and authority. In addition, he is aware that he is very popular among the people and that he enjoys unanimous support for the efforts he has been making. His political-diplomatic respectability in the world is as great, however, the prime minister has severe opponents and aggressively ambitious rivals within his own (ruling) party [Party of Democratic Action—SDA]. For the time being, they are the winners, because it was impossible for such a political context to last for a long time.

But Prime Minister Silajdzic was not the only one in Zenica who experienced a deliberated and well-organized political "assassination" of his own dignity and authority. One can equally speak about a defeat of parliamentary democracy in our country at the moment when it ought to be more important to us than any partisan interest or personal political aspiration. The adoption of the amendment to the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina represents a drastic and dramatic change of adopted democratic principles with consequences that are difficult even to anticipate at the moment. Under the cloak of orderly democratic procedure, with the extreme and insolent ignoring of the parliamentary opposition, the will of the ruling party, which was stated much earlier, has been executed, and the electoral character of the Presidency as a collective body of equal members has been degraded. The five members of the highest state body have warned in a letter, all in vain, that it is not wise to modify fundamental principles of the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina under war conditions, and that a change in the constitutional authority of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina presupposes the general accord of all the citizens and constituent peoples. The will of the ruling party and ambition of the man whom the party is pushing forward are (for now) stronger and more important than the democratic principles that were considered inviolable. Deputy Mujadzic addressing the "gentlemen signatories of the letter" clearly speaks for the fact that it is about the organized degradation of the remaining members of the Presidency, the final concentration of power to suit the SDA and the announcement of a completely new political atmosphere that it is hard to believe would benefit either the strengthening of the defense capacity of the country in the current dramatic circumstances or the mobilization of all democratic forces in the state in a unique patriotic alliance. About the consequences for democracy, without which we have no future, we shall talk only later, if it is not too late already.

The resignation of Prime Minister Silajdzic—aside from possibly being very indicative and symptomatic for the members of the Presidency to whom it was made clear that they are needless, after which a more serious reaction on their part should follow—may in the long run prove to be effective. Even if the prime minister decides not to heed the voice of the many people who support him, perhaps there will now be a cleansing of the political sediment that has caused many important things in our country to not work as they should. For the time being, though, it is a mere Pyhrric victory over democracy.

UN: Kladusa Refugee Situation 'Extremely Dire'

AU1708153595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 17 Aug 95

[Report by Nada al-Issa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Velika Kladusa is free and beautiful. Refugees from Velika Kladusa have only one solution and that is to return to their homes. The UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR], the UNHCR, and the authorities of the Una-Sana Canton authorities, as well as the entire Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, are all advocating this course of action. UNPROFOR says that several thousand refugees are near Vojnic in the Republic of Croatia, that their living conditions are extremely dire; there is a danger of various epidemics [words indistinct] ill; this is official UNPROFOR data.

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A UN spokesman has said that representatives of the peace forces tried to reach the area, but that they had allegedly been banned from the region by the Croatian authorities. However, it must be said that the Croatian authorities have absolutely no obligation toward these refugees since they voluntarily abandoned their homes; they were not forced to do so. On the contrary. The Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities and local authorities of the Una-Sana Canton are constantly appealing to them—today as well, Cantonal President Mirsad Veladzic told us—to return to their homes. The UNHCR does not have any obligations toward the so-called Kladusa refugees for the same reasons; these are people who did not flee out of necessity, but out of capriciousness and because of the intense propaganda of former politician Fikret Abdic.

UN representatives say that the situation of the Kladusa refugees in Vojnic is dramatic; however, neither Bosnia nor Croatia are to blame for this. They, themselves, are to blame, those of them who believed the false propaganda. Many of them have already seen that they can expect nothing more from Fikret Abdic, so the Velika Kladusa road is full of refugees who are returning to their homes. The remaining ones should do the same. [passage omitted]

Refugees Expelled by Serbs Reach Central Bosnia

AU1808063795 Paris AFP in English
2140 GMT 17 Aug 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug 17 (AFP)—The first of what is expected to be a flood of Moslem refugees expelled from northern Bosnia by Serbs arrived Thursday in the central Bosnian town of Turbe, Bosnian television reported.

A group of 53 refugees arrived in the town, just short of the front lines, following a mass exodus of Bosnian Croats from the northern Bosnian town of Banja Luka, the television reported.

Seventeen convoys have arrived since August 6, according to Bosnian radio, but it has not been clear how many people were in the convoys.

At least 4,500 people, mostly Croats but some Moslems, were deported northwards from Banja Luka this week into Croatia, according to figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

A 1991 census, done the year before the war broke out here, put the population at 624,840 Serbs, 355,956 Moslems and 180,593 Croats. Thousands fled the region in the first paroxysm of "ethnic cleansing" three years ago, and an estimated 5,000 left in the first half of this year.

UN Warns Mladic Not To Attack Safe Areas

AU1808115295 Paris AFP in English
1102 GMT 18 Aug 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Aug 18 (AFP)—The United Nations said Friday it is withdrawing its Ukrainian troops from the eastern Bosnian enclave of Gorazde in the coming days, and that British troops would be out by mid-September.

"A decision will be made in the near future on who will replace the British forces in Gorazde," UN spokesman Alexander Ivanko said. [passage omitted]

Britain has about 180 troops, officers and administrative personnel in Gorazde. Ukraine has 90.

Ivanko said Thursday that the United Nations had issued a tough warning to Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic, saying that "any threat or attack on a safe area will be met by a firm and rapid response by NATO airpower which will not necessarily be proportional, nor will it be limited to the immediate area surrounding the safe area under threat or attack." [passage omitted]

Krajisnik: No Exchange of Trebinje for Sea Access

LD1708203095 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1950 GMT 17 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 17 Aug (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the People's Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, this evening denied reports launched by some media and by certain circles in the West that plans for a peaceful solution to the crisis envisage the exchange of Trebinje for a [Bosnian] Serb access to the sea. After categorically denying that there are any grounds for these and similar reports, speaker Krajisnik told SRNA that certain circles in the West are tendentiously carrying these reports in order to cause doubts among the soldiers, and thus weaken their fighting and defense morale.

Krajisnik said these reports are pure propaganda. He stressed that earlier the Serbs negotiated with the Croats about access to the sea, but there had never been any talk about the exchange of Trebinje for such access.

"The Serb army has the right, and will do everything to recover the occupied parts of the Trebinje municipality," the People's Assembly speaker said. He also sent a message to Serb soldiers saying: "You must not succumb to propaganda at these times."

"We will have as much of the Trebinje municipality and the sea and the [Bosnian] Serb Republic as we manage to liberate and as far as we manage to push the enemy back," Krajisnik said. He urged Serb soldiers to fight resolutely and defend the Serb Republic.

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Talks With Bildt, Stoltenberg

LD1708215895 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2105 GMT 17 Aug 95

[From the "Picture vs. Picture" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the Bosnian Serb parliament, was in Geneva for secret talks the day before yesterday. As the United Nations in Zagreb reported, quoting REUTER, he held talks with Carl Bildt and Thorvald Stoltenberg. The outcome of their secret negotiations is not known, but this is no obstacle for Krajisnik's daydreaming.

[Begin Krajisnik recording; captioned as being from Bosnian Serb television] In connection with that proposal, we indicated that we are not interested, but the Muslims should be interested in asking us to exchange Gorazde for parts of Sarajevo. If the Muslims say they want to do that, they can either remain an enclave in Serb territory or they can suggest the exchange, which we would consider. Our people must not misled into thinking that we will just give them Sarajevo or parts of Sarajevo.

The Serb request for access to the sea was also received with understanding. They [as heard] base this on an agreement between Serbs and Croats that Konavle and the area in the south Adriatic will be given up for certain exchanges. So, these Croatian attacks are unnecessary, because the agreement to this effect exists, and the Serbs will have to be given access to the sea by one means or another.

Our enemies will do anything to improve their military standing, and they have been given a green light. We must keep our faith and hope, and we have good reason to believe that we will get a state. The actual state of affairs is such, but we must do everything to defend our state. If we defend it successfully, we have the right to have a state, and we will get it. [end recording]

Karadzic Says FRY Can Have the Glory

LD1808162595 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1542 GMT 18 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Doboj, 18 Aug (SRNA)—Radovan Karadzic, the president of the Serb Republic and supreme commander of the Armed Forces was surprised at Serbia's inability to recognize its own national interest in the just struggle of the Serbs west of the Drina.

"We do not understand attempts at destabiizing the Serb Republic through manipulations coming from our mother country and which are not proper to the Serb people," the president of the Serb Republic said during his visit to Doboj.

"We are not bothered by trips to Belgrade, we even asked former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to go the capital of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and find a solution for peace over there," added Karadzic, saying that glory and success, should this be the case, will result in everything being divided between President Milosevic and us.

"We even want Belgrade to have all the glory. They can have the glory as long as we have the state," said the president of the Serb Republic in conclusion.

Visits Military Factories

LD1808154795 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1426 GMT 18 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Doboj, 18 Aug (SRNA)—President of the Serb Republic Radovan Karadzic visited Doboj today for a working meeting with the presidents of the wartime presidencies of 11 municipalities in the wider Doboj area and the presidents of municipal branches of the Serbian Democratic Party.

"Doboj, Ozren and Posavina [north Bosnia] guarantee the Serb Republic's survival as they are areas that demand particular attention. This area is a compact whole as well as the link between the east and the west part of the Serb Republic," Karadzic said after the meeting.

President Karadzic also visited special production [military] factories in the wider Doboj area.

As well as Karadzic the delegation in Doboj also included Velibor Ostojic, chairman of the SDS Executive Committee, Defense Minister Milan Ninkovic, and Major General Bogdan Subotic.

Karadzic Explains Views on Military Leadership

AU1708210995 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 12-13 Aug 95 pp 2-4

[Interview with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic by Gordan Matrak and Ranko Preradovic in Banja Luka on 9 August: "We Have To Come Out the Winners"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [GLAS SRPSKI] After your decision to transform the main staff [glavni stab] into the staff of the supreme command of the army [stab vrhovne komande vojske], which was supported by the national assembly and the government of the Serb Republic, the ambitions of the military leadership to conduct politics in the republic became obvious. How is it possible to overcome all this without disturbing the firmness of the defense of the Serb Republic?

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[Karadzic] Indeed, along with all the good qualities of our officers, there is one fault, which is that they like to get involved with just about everything, which can sometimes be charming when they make sarma [traditional Bosnian dish] or when they help the municipal authorities organize civil affairs, but it is very dangerous, even unconstitutional and criminal, when they negotiate with foreigners. In that way, they enable foreigners to consider our country as merely territory with rebels, instead of a state with legitimate authorities. I am very decisive and strict in not allowing anybody the right to violate the constitution and the laws, no matter how deserving or charming they might be. [passage omitted]

[GLAS SRPSKI] Do we need all this now, at this moment, and what in fact is the essence of the disagreement between Belgrade and Pale?

[Karadzic] Disagreements are never needed, they are always damaging and dangerous, but disagreements among Serbs are unfortunately a regularity for us. They said publicly that it would have been good if we had accepted any plan, boasting that they would have accepted any plan by now. However, up to now the plans have been designed to defeat us. The Vance-Owen plan was designed to make our state disappear, and reduce us to some districts. [passage omitted]

[GLAS SRPSKI] In Moscow, at the invitation of Boris Yeltsin, Tudjman and Milosevic were supposed to meet. However, Milosevic went there alone, since Tudjman conditioned his presence on the presence of the uninvited Izetbegovic. So, other people are talking about our destiny. What are we to do in such a situation?

[Karadzic] Their talks about our destiny, if we do not like them, are not worth anything, because we will not accept any of that. I believe that the West gave a hint to Tudjman to pose conditions, and in this way refuse to go to Russia. One should not forget that the West will not allow Russia to become renowned for ending this war and solving the crisis. The vanity and the internal political needs of Western politicians will not allow this, because at the end of the Bosnian crisis somebody will win the elections, and maybe even the Nobel Prize.

The West will not allow President Yeltsin to be that one, with all our respect for President Yeltsin, and President Milosevic, and Russia, and Serbia. But the trip of President Milosevic to Moscow has great significance; it was a proper tragedy for Serbia and the Serbian people that some factors in Serbia took the side of the communist putschists, and that postponed the meeting and the cooperation of Milosevic and Yeltsin for three or four crucial years. Had they cooperated from the first day, the suffering of the Serbian people and the territorial losses would have been much smaller. [passage omitted]

[GLAS SRPSKI] There is another avalanche of mutual accusations for the exodus of the people and the fall of the Republic of Serb Krajina. As we can see, Milan Babic is accusing Martic of betrayal and some elements in Belgrade are even accusing you and the military leadership of the Serb Republic. What is hidden behind that?

[Karadzic] What is hidden behind that are various alibis, but this is a moment for the search for alibis. Alibis are sought by those who have none, and Milan Martic has one. He has been in this struggle from the first day, less in the political, and more in the real, military fight. It does not even occur to Martic that he should accuse anybody, because he neither feels guilty, nor do others consider him guilty. The need to accuse others is characteristic of those who have an uneasy conscience and who need to project their own feelings of guilt onto others. Krajina was first destroyed by politics, petty politicking. Some of it came from their local needs and circumstances, and some was delegated and conducted from Belgrade. The political chaos in Krajina was the beginning of the tragedy. Now you can understand why I do not allow political chaos in the Serb Republic. I do not allow any arrogant or willful behavior of the military. I do not allow anybody's behavior to go beyond the limits of law and the constitution. You see, I am in the position not to allow it because we have a complete political unity, because we are not petty politicians, and because I am not the only one who has power, but I share it with my associates. [passage omitted]

[GLAS SRPSKI] Talking about the Serb Democratic Party [SDS]: It is in the process of transformation and modernization. In which direction does that process go?

[Karadzic] Before and during the elections we had a huge number of members, and after the elections those members became merely sympathizers, some were simply neglected by the party, because its work on the ground was not well organized. The important thing is that the SDS is now moving from the democratic center slightly toward right of center, precisely because of our economic concept, which we call national capitalism. [passage omitted]

[GLAS SRPSKI] As an open and clearly democratic paper, a few days ago the editors of the GLAS SRPSKI offered our generals, led by Mladic, to give us an interview and tell us what they have to say. We have not received any response from them, at least not yet, whereas in the Serbian media they do not hesitate to give their statements and comments, claiming at the same

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time that they have no access to the media in the Serb Republic. What is this supposed to mean?

[Karadzic] At the very beginning of the war, as I realized that some statements of the generals who carried political weight only caused political harm on the international plane, I forbade the officers to make any statements except for those about the current military situation. I have never withdrawn that restriction, but in a way we have overcome it, because we also wanted to make legends out of our generals, no matter whether or not they deserved it. However, many people prefer doing other people's work to their own, and they rush into politics as though these were the times of peace and as though they were not under an oath to serve this state and this people. Officers cannot oppose the regime—because they are an organ of that regime. [passage omitted]

[Box, p 2]

The Defended and the Undefended

[GLAS SRPSKI] We would like to ask you to comment on the latest agreement between the Yugoslav Army and the eastern Slavonia corps of the Serb army of Krajina. That military agreement is partial, and it is a fact that Yugoslavia did not act according to the Vance-Owen plan, although its signature [on the Vance-Owen plan] obliged it to defend the entire Republic of Serb Krajina?

[Karadzic] Unfortunately, it turns out that those areas which border Serbia are going to be defended, and that those bordering the Serb Republic are not going to be defended. That agreement is for me completely natural and obligatory. It should have been made earlier, but it had to refer to the entire Serb Krajina, much more than, for example, the Serb Republic, because Yugoslavia did not sign any guarantees that it would defend it, although in its constitution Serbia does provide for the defense of Serbs outside Serbia. I believe that a unique supreme command should be established urgently, a unique staff for the armed forces of all Serb lands, and resist any further tearing of Serb territories into pieces, and I guarantee that the world would be angry, but that they would soon accept it.

Serb Army Says Karadzic Manipulating Media

LD1708164895 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1445 GMT 17 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [ ]ja Luka, 17 Aug (TANJUG)—The main headquarters of the Bosnian Serb Republic Army [BSA] today said that Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic "has neither recalled nor proclaimed null and void his decision on the changes in the Army, but has only postponed its implementation, probably being aware that at present he does not enjoy support from the main elements of our society—the people and the Army."

A communique by the main HQ of the BSA information service says that Karadzic, "by exercising media pressure on the public and imposing an information blockade on the Army, is trying to underestimate successes achieved by the Army and manipulate the public, creating new conditions for the realization of the announced changes."

Reacting to a public statement by the Serb Republic president of 11 August that he "is halting the changes in the BSA," the main HQ says that by this "the unconstitutional and illegal act of renaming the BSA main HQ into the Serb Republic Army general staff and replacing Colonel General Ratko Mladic from the post of the commander of the BSA main HQ has not been eliminated; the envisaged changes have been postponed until a later, more favorable time."

The BSA Main HQ information service notes that Col. Gen. Ratko Mladic and other representatives of the BSA main HQ are banned from making public appearances in the Serb Republic's media, whereby the Army is prevented from explaining its views and the emerging military and political situation.

"At the same time, day in day out, the Serb Republic's media are carrying prebooked messages of support to the republic's leadership for its efforts to discipline the BSA, stressing frequently that the Army is threatening the state. These same mediators are forgetting that the state was created and exists in the first place thanks to the Army's involvement," the main HQ says in their communique.

The communique also cautions that an attempt to nevertheless carry out changes within the Army "could bring about unforeseeable consequences for the Serbian people" and that "all units, command bodies, and institutions in the BSA fully support Col. Gen. Ratko Mladic, the commander of the BSA main HQ, and the Main HQ, demanding that the announced changes be recalled and efforts be made to persevere in fighting until the final victory of the Serbian people."

"The BSA main HQ and the BSA as a whole remain firm and united in our view that for the time being priority should be attached to defending the Serbian people, crushing the ustasha-Muslim offensive, and preserving the borders of the republic," the BSA main HQ stresses and says that "at the same time manipulators of public opinion must know that the BSA is firmly embedded in all segments of our society and is firmly committed to stand by the people in its protection and create

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conditions for building a united, legal, and democratic Serbian state."

HQs Cites Support for Mladic

LD1808133895 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1227 GMT 18 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, 18 Aug (SRNA)—The Main HQ [Headquarters] of the Army of the Serb Republic [BSA] today states that "every day BSA units, command bodies and institutions, as well as social organizations and associations of citizens from the Serb Republic and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serb intellectuals and distinguished personalities from around the world, are sending telegrams to this HQ and its commander, General Ratko Mladic, demanding their perseverance in their commitments and duties to fight for and protect the Serbian people."

The telegrams, as the Main HQ says, support Mladic's decision to refuse dismissal in his capacity as commander of the Main HQ and that of the commanders who have sided with Mladic.

In its statement, the Main HQ cites excerpts from several telegrams sent by the commanders of individual BSA units, pleading their loyalty to the Main HQ.

In today's statement the Main HQ reiterates that "there is a high degree of unity in all units...that the Serbian people's struggle will be waged until the final victory and freedom, together with the fighters and those people who have so far demonstrated their patriotism, high awareness, and responsibility, and who will not tolerate any kind of divisions in the Army and the Serbian people."

Plavsic Placates Military, Promises 'Cadre Purge'

AU1808080795 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 16 Aug 95 p 14

[Article by N.K and Z.L.: "Biljana Plavsic Reconciled Military and Political Leadership of the Serb Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As TELEGRAF has learned from the circles close to the Serb Republic Army, Biljana Plavsic, vice president of the Serb Republic, played a crucial role in the reconciliation of the Bosnian Serb generals and politicians. Miss Plavsic, who is generally popular with the soldiers, in the past few days visited the 7th Corps of the Serb Republic Army in Banja Luka and the troops in Bijeljina where she held talks with generals and other officers.

According to TELEGRAF's sources, Biljana Plavsic managed to convince senior Serb Republic Army officers, who overwhelmingly support General Ratko Mladic, about the need to overcome the Karadzic-Mladic dispute. The Serb Republic vice president promised "the soldiers" that in Pale, where the Serb Republic political leadership is situated, a cadre purge would take place soon and all those politicians who indulged in war profiteering would be removed.

After explaining to the Serb Republic Army officers that Gen. Ratko Mladic was appointed the operative commander of the joint armies of the Serb Republic and the Republic of Serb Krajina and not a sort of an adviser and coordinator, as had been thought earlier, they promised Biljana Plavsic that "the soldiers" would not meddle in politics, at least not in this critical moment.

Commentary Appeals to Serbs To End Disputes

AU1808090695 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 8 Aug 95 p 2

[Commentary by Zeljko Kopanja: "Hand to Hand"]

[FBIS Translated Text] To everybody who is of Serbian origin, everything is definitely clear. These are the days, hours, and minutes when decisions are being made on the destiny of the Serbian people. On its existence on ever-Serbian land. Not only Knin, Benkovac, Petrinja, Glina, Glamoc, Grahovo, Kupres... are in question. Gradiska, Laktasi, Banja Luka, Brcko, Bijeljina, Srbinje, Trebinje.... are also in question. And not only them. Pristina, Pec, Gracanica, Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Plav, Kikinda, Subotica, Zrenjanin, and Novi Sad are in question and perhaps even—I dare not think of it.

Therefore, today, when it is as difficult as never before, nobody, and really nobody has a right to lift himself above the interests of the people. This is the time when, because of the possible tragedy of the entire people, all disagreements and disputes must be thrown away. There is no time for arguments among all Serbian national policies, and this is definitely no time for establishing anybody's accountability for all the horrors that the Serbian people is facing. There will be enough time for that, because what is happening now cannot be simply forgotten. The hundreds of thousands of Serbs expelled from their homes cannot forget that, let alone forgive it.

The moment has come when no mistake must be made. Simply, this is the moment when Serbs ought to lend a hand to fellow Serbs, to agree on where to go, and, what is more important, how to act further. Everything else is a catastrophe, and whoever thinks otherwise, or even worse, whoever does otherwise, risks being denounced as a traitor by the people. He risks that in the centuries to come his name, but also the family name of his descendants, might be detested as a symbol of treachery.

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In this way and no other is the letter sent by the people's assembly of the Serb Republic to the Assemblies of FRY, Serbia, and Montenegro to be understood. The letter in which the Serbs across the Drina River ask their brethren for help, shows expressively that the time has come, and that the seriousness of the moment has been properly assessed. It can be seen from the letter that, despite everything, the faith among the Serbs across the Drina River in their mother country still lives and will further live.

Besides, the letter of the assembly deputies of the Serb Republic is a hand of reconciliation extended to those in Belgrade, if they understand that or want to understand that at all. We pray to God that it will be accepted. Otherwise, as it says in the letter, the two million Serbs across the Drina River will find themselves in fatal danger. Does anybody have a right to put them in such a situation?

On the other hand, despite the unfavorable situation and troubles on the front, as soon as a Serbian soldier from the Serb Republic sees Milosevic, Lilic, Bulatovic, Karadzic, Mladic, Perisic, Martic, Mrksic.... sitting at a table together and smiling to one another, everything will be different. Most of all, the Serbs will be a happy people, no matter how difficult the situation may be. It will be such a stimulus to the Serbian army that all the dreams of the Muslims and Croats about defeating the Serbs across the Drina River and occupying their land will burst like bubbles. Then the columns of desperate people expelled from their homes will cease moving toward Serbia. Then the international community, customarily opposed to us, will understand that they can no longer play on the card of Serbian discord. And that discord is precisely the card on which our enemies have been playing for one year. And obviously, they have begun to win. Does any Serb have a right to such behavior?

Therefore, Serbia, show that you care as Tudjman's criminals are flying their aircraft over Petrovac, bombarding and firing at helpless columns of refugees! We know that it is not all the same to you, and it will never be. But, do raise your voice—more firmly, severely, and strongly than so far. Take our letter as a cry of your brethren. Do you have the right to ignore our cry?

Nobody is guiltless in this four-year-long story of the struggle of the Serbian people for survival. But is now the right time to waste strength on that? Is not it time to launch a decisive battle? Either a military or a political battle, it is all the same. We can win that battle. The precondition for that is agreement. Why is it so difficult for the Serbs to agree in such moments? If it is, then the end of this four-year-long story is quite near. Then everything will be senseless.

In the history of the Serbian people no such thing has ever happened. I hope it will not happen now either. In these days, our purpose of life is the belief that the Serbs will agree; actually, that the Serbian leaders will agree in these days in which they have no right to discord.

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Russia Allegedly Selling Weapons to Croats

BR1708143395 Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 17-23 Aug 95 p 29

[Article by "R.B. and K.S.K.": "Who Armed the Croats?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to French military intelligence, some of the weapons used by the Croatian Army in the Krajina offensive were in fact destined for Bosnia. For months now, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries have been funding massive arms purchases on the international market which were intended for Sarajevo. These weapons are delivered by heavy cargo planes, Iranian aircraft in particular, to a Croatian airfield before being shipped in to Bosnia. In exchange for its material aid and its role of intermediary, the Croatian Army is allowed to levy a "tax in kind" on these deliveries which is said to have totaled almost 50 percent on some shipments. This original channel enabled Zagreb to stock up on light weapons and high tech equipment at very little cost (missiles, telecom systems, and so on). Where heavy equipment is concerned (tanks, artillery, shells, and aviation), contracts have duly been concluded with specialist firms, mainly in Eastern Europe. This does not rule out a few other original—and unexpected—channels.

Images of the Croatian offensive in Krajina broadcast a few weeks ago by Russian TV, for example, caused something of a stir among weapons market specialists: While Russia is in principle allied with the Serbs, the very latest Russian tanks and guns were identified in Franjo Tudjman's Croatian arsenal during the capture of Knin. The experts knew full well that the Germans had sold the Croats the MiG-21's it inherited from the former East Germany. It was also a known fact that the Ukrainians had supplied Mi-24 combat helicopters and that the Hungarians and the Poles had also given Zagreb Soviet-manufactured hardware. However, the tanks and guns of a 1995 vintage could only have come from Russian arsenals, which are directly controlled by the Kremlin. SEVDONIA, the newspaper of the Most banking group which is currently at loggerheads with the Kremlin confirmed that "our heart is with the Serbs, but our arms are with the Croats," and went on to quote "reliable sources in the Foreign Ministry."

These deliveries do not mean that Boris Yeltsin has secretly switched his allegiances in the former Yugoslavia. They illustrate, however, the extraordinary confusion that reigns in Russia in the industry of arms sales. To put a stop to the veritable cut-price sale of fighting equipment that followed Boris Yeltsin's arrival in power and which enabled dealers to amass vast fortunes by selling off Army stocks, in 1994 the Kremlin created a huge state-owned company, Rosvoroujenie [name as published], which was the only official dealer in industrially produced military equipment. Marshall Shaposhnikov, a senior officer considered a respectable and honest man, took over at the head of the organization. However, it would appear that he has been unable to control an industry that is running over with entrepreneurs who continue to operate by splitting their profits with the leading figures in Russia. There is no mystery—Russian traffickers sold arms to the Chechens. Why should they not also have sold arms to the Croats, who are not short of dollars or marks.

Granic: Bosnia Undivided 'for the Time Being'

AU1808105095 Hamburg DIE WOCHE in German 18 Aug 95 p 27

[Interview with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic by Branimir Baron Brljevic; place and date not given: "Bosnia Remains—For the Time Being"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Brljevic] From the military point of view, the Croatian operation "Storm" was undoubtedly a success. Does this apply to the political point of view?

[Granic] In the first place, a new situation has developed—and the alliance between Croatia and Bosnia is stronger than ever. The geostrategic situation for the objective of a final and just peace on the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia has never been as favorable as it is now. Now this also makes new peace initiatives possible.

[Brljevic] What do you think of the new U.S. peace plan?

[Granic] Actually, it does not contain anything new. It consists of three parts: mutual recognition of all successor states of Yugoslavia; the division of the territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina, essentially according to the Contact Group plan; the lifting of the sanctions for the FRY.

[Brljevic] That is to say, Bosnia-Herzegovina is to disappear?

[Granic] No, the country will be maintained by a loose confederation of the three nationalities. For the time being, it will continue to exist as an undivided state. It is still too early to talk about dividing Bosnia. One will have to wait for a few years.

[Brljevic] Would such initiatives not also be possible without the invasion of Krajina?

[Granic] After the fall of the eastern Bosnian Muslim enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa, we could not permit

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the fall of the Muslim enclave of Bihac, too. This would have been a threat to both Croatia and our confederal partner, neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. For four years, we negotiated with the rebellious Serbs, for four years we waited for the mandate of the UN Protection Force and the UN Confidence Restoration Operation to be implemented.

[Brljevic] In practice, however, the military operation amounted to ethnically cleansing the Krajina of Serbs.

[Granic] You certainly know that Milan Babic (head of government of the Krajina Serbs) has accused so-called President (of Serbian Krajina) Milan Martic of having organized the people's exodus from Krajina, that is, by force. We have no reason to disbelieve that. What happened there was not our intention, it happened according to the script of the rebellious Serbs. We are aware that Croatia's involvement in the European integration process depends of how quickly we apply all the provisions of international law, which means the protection of civilians and refugees, the return of the refugees to their homes, both the Croats and the Serbs, who followed Martic's orders.

[Brljevic] Since the Croats reconquered Krajina militarily, how do you want to achieve the Serbs' return?

[Granic] We understand Croatia as a house where everyone can find his place and we will emphatically advocate the return of the refugees to their homeland. Of course, this only applies to those who have not committed any war crimes. We do not want to uproot the population, we do not want to exchange territories, the people must have room in their homeland. The principle of private property is equally as sacred to us as the right to one's homeland.

[Brljevic] However, the British press has reported a Tudjman plan to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia.

[Granic] There is no such plan between President Tudjman and President Milosevic. There have not been any agreements on it. Serbia is the real aggressor, the victims are Croatia and Bosnia. Serbia is still occupying 4.6 percent of our territory.

[Brljevic] Is that the reason Croatian President Franjo Tudjman rejected Yeltsin's invitation to Moscow?

[Granic] We basically welcome every peace initiative, but it must be well prepared. The meeting in Moscow was not well prepared. Second, our president is firmly convinced that Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic must also be present during talks on a solution of the Balkan crisis.

[Brljevic] Do you continue to accept the efforts at mediation by the EU (Carl Bildt) and the United Nations (Thorvald Stoltenberg)?

[Granic] As far as Mr. Carl Bildt is concerned: For us, he already belongs to the past. We cannot negotiate any further with him. Mr. Stoltenberg disagreeably surprised us with his statement that all Croats and Bosnians are actually Serbs. We clearly gave him to understand otherwise. However, our government does not want to exclude Mr. Stoltenberg from the peace process. We are prepared for cooperation with the world community, although we do not have any illusions in view of the previous behavior of the mediators.

Deputy Minister Views Dubrovnik, East Slavonia

AU1808095895 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0612 GMT 18 Aug 95

[Telephone interview with Croatian Deputy Foreign Minister Ivo Sanader in Zagreb by Dirk Mueller in Cologne—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Mueller] Good morning, Mr. Sanader.

[Sanader] Good morning.

[Mueller] Mr. Sanader, it looks as though Croatia will not content itself with the military reconquest of Krajina.

[Sanader] You are probably referring to Dubrovnik. We believe that the attacks on Dubrovnik and the entire region on the southern Croatian Adriatic coast should stop. Thus, we have done everything possible so far to halt this offensive and the shelling and bombing of Dubrovnik and of the region. We addressed a corresponding letter to the Security Council. If no success should be achieved through diplomatic channels, the Croatian state and the Croatian Government should and will have to consider the use of other instruments to stop this offensive, this inconceivable offensive against Dubrovnik.

[Mueller] Mr. Sanader, does this mean that the Croatian Government considers it quite legitimate for the Croatian Army to carry out military operations on Bosnian territory, that is, outside the Croatian borders.

[Sanader] As is known, there are some legal foundations for that. First, there is the agreement between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina that was signed between Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic on 21 July 1992, that is three years ago, on military cooperation in border areas. Dubrovnik is a border region. Second, there is the Washington Agreement on the federation of the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and confederation with the Republic

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of Croatia. Third—and most important—there is the so-called Split Declaration that was signed three weeks ago when the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa made it clear to everybody that the international community could really defend the protected areas and when another protected area—the protected area of Bihac—threatened to fall. At that, I would say, historic moment, the meeting in Split took place, during which the Bosnian Government asked Croatia for help, above all for military help, but also for any other kind of assistance. These are the foundations for military cooperation between the Bosnian and Croatian Governments.

[Mueller] Mr. Sanader, Croatian President Tudjman has explicitly welcomed the U.S. peace initiative, stressing that a political solution to the conflict in the Balkans has now again become possible. Is it not true that the most recent operations by the Croatian Army are again ruining these possibilities?

[Sanader] I would like to stress once more that there are no military offensives and operations by the Croatian Army. Dubrovnik is being shelled. According to a UNESCO decision of a few years ago, Dubrovnik is not only a town that represents a cultural value for Croatia, but for the whole world. There are numerous German tourists who know Dubrovnik and the southern part of the Croatian Adriatic coast very well. All who know this region would agree that we must do something to defend this town. The Serbs have been attacking this town for three weeks. This is inconceivable and unacceptable for us. There is no Croatian offensive at this point, but it cannot be ruled out in the future.

[Mueller] Let us jump from southern Bosnia to northeastern Croatia, to eastern Slavonia. The Croatians are also concentrating military forces there, but the Serbs in Belgrade told them to stop at a certain point. What will happen to eastern Slavonia? Is Croatia deliberately restraining itself?

[Sanader] Eastern Slavonia is part of the Croatian territory. The Republic of Croatia was internationally recognized within its borders at the beginning of 1992. That includes the border on the Danube River with Yugoslavia. Croatia has always also been a Danubian country. There is no reason whatsoever for giving up this territory. It is Croatian territory, particularly because—I would like to make this very clear—the Croatians represented a relative majority among the population and an absolute majority with the Hungarian minority there before the war. They have all been expelled from there. There are over 100,000 people in Zagreb and other towns in Croatia—Croatians and Hungarians—who were expelled from eastern Slavonia. As far as the troop concentration of the Croatian Army is concerned, this does not exist. However, there is a front line there, which we have fortified. At the moment, there is no reason whatsoever for us to solve the problem with military means. We do not want to do that. We want to settle this problem peacefully and through negotiations with the Serbs living there so that a solution to the conquest of Croatia and the occupied areas is found and that the last piece of the former occupied territories in Croatia and on Croatian territory is liberated. I would like to add that, in this spirit, we will naturally also start talks with Belgrade on the normalization of relations between Croatia and Yugoslavia. Even after a 30-year war, peace should be achieved. Croatia, which was a victim of Serbian aggression in 1991-92, wants to settle this problem with peaceful means.

[Mueller] Mr. Sanader, the Croatian Government allegedly maintains good relations with Belgrade anyway.

[Sanader] Since the beginning of 1994, we have had a representative office in Belgrade. The FRY has a representative office in Zagreb. This was the first step toward the normalization of relations. I think this should be welcomed. However, if you are referring to Bosnia: There is no agreement between Tudjman and Milosevic. There can be no agreement between the presidents of two countries if one is being occupied by the other. It is not logical to hold talks with such a country about the division of another country. We have very good relations, and we support the project of a federation and confederation with the Muslims. We also want to implement it, and there is no plan for a division of Bosnia, particularly because we completely support the U.S. plan, as you just said.

[Mueller] Let us mention one last point—the situation in Krajina. After the reconquest by the Croatian Army, the United Nations has repeatedly leveled the allegation that there were Croatian attacks on Serbian refugees, that the Serbian refugees were shelled. Now there is also talk of looting and pillaging on the part of the Croatian Army. What is the view of the Foreign Ministry? How can this be stopped?

[Sanader] Look, human rights violations certainly occur occasionally during a war. The government gave clear instructions to the soldiers and the policemen before the operation, the liberation of Krajina. Let me stress one thing: Many UN reports from affected areas have turned out not to be true. This also applies to Krajina. There are no Krajina refugees. It was their free decision to leave last week. Thus, there are no refugees at the moment. There are refugees in Bosnia fleeing from Banja Luka to Croatia. But they are not Serbs living there. This is the current refugee wave. As far as looting is concerned, I

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can assure you that the Croatian police, the soldiers, and the Croatian Army have received clear orders to behave in an appropriate manner. Thus, the possessions of all Croatian citizens, no matter whether they belong to the Croat or Serb ethnic group, are being protected. In this spirit, every possible offense will be punished.

AFP: Dubrovnik Digs In, Predicts Offensive

AU1708204395 Paris AFP in English 2022 GMT 17 Aug 95

[By Jean-Luc Porte]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Dubrovnik, Croatia, Aug 17 (AFP)—The Croatian army and residents of the historic coastal city of Dubrovnik made final preparations, ahead of a major Croatian offensive into Bosnia which they predicted would begin Friday [18 August].

"The war will begin tomorrow," one of a group of young army reservists said Thursday as they sat drinking in a cafe.

"They interrupted my leave, and I have to return to my base," a young painter, who asked not to be named, said. Workers in the ancient city centre, classified as World Heritage Site by UNESCO, were busily boarding up buildings and protecting them with bales of straw.

Reporters said thousands of Croatian soldiers had already crossed into southern Bosnia and were advancing on the town of Trebinje, some 20 kilometres (16 miles) from Dubrovnik.

The town, located on high land overlooking Dubrovnik, has been the source of recent artillery bombardments of the coastal city, which Croatian military leaders have vowed to end. [passage omitted]

There was no immediate comment from Croatian officials on the action but reporters travelling in the mountainous border region above Dubrovnik saw thousands of Croatian soldiers, most of them inside Bosnia.

One Croatian soldier told AFP his unit had reached the city limits of Trebrinje.

The soldier said the Croatian army drive was not aimed at capturing the entire southern Bosnian region from the Serbs but was designed "to stop the shelling of Dubrovnik, which has been virtually continuous these past days."

UN officials in Zagreb confirmed that Croatian troops were continuing to pour into the Dubrovnik area, with spokesman Christopher Gunness putting the number of Croatian soldiers there at more than 4,000, backed up by tanks and artillery.

New roads have reportedly been carved out, presumably to allow the passage of tanks along the tops of the mountain in the Snijeznica region, east of Dubrovnik.

The defence lines between Croatian and Serb forces had not moved Thursday, the Bosnian Serb military sources said.

Bosnian Serb sources in their capital Pale, near Sarajevo, said the Croatian offensive on Trebinje was aimed at cutting the Bosnian Serbs' access to the Adriatic. [passage omitted]

Serb Attacks on Dubrovnik Considered 'Suicidal'

AU1708185595 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 17 Aug 95 p 3

[Commentary by Fran Visnar: "Croatia Is Preparing To Respond"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Wars are fought to implement policy, expand territory, prevent the growth of a force, or take advantage of its fall. The Bosnian Serbs, the local Trebinje leaders in particular, obviously think they are dealing with a weak state and that Croatia will never run out of patience, since they dare bombard Dubrovnik, its coastal area, and Cilipi Airport with such intensity. As the Serb artillery kept hitting civilian targets (using phosphor shells so as to ignite fires), the Croatian Army has recently struck back. A short but fierce response including artillery, mortars, and missiles deployed along the state border pounded a not very densely populated area almost 100 km in length (causing fires that the Serbs still have not bothered to put out) and has warned Vucurevic [local Bosnian Serb leader in Trebinje] (who calls himself the "Croatian shadow minister of tourism") of what will happen if the violence continues.

There has not been such an artillery duel since 1991. If Croatia steps up its combat activity, the damage to the Serb side will be devastating, as the Croatian artillery-missile units are now three to four times stronger than four years ago. And that is why the Serbs have dragged a large number of long-range guns to the Trebinje area, mobilized their infantry, and evacuated civilians. Furthermore, they are fortifying their positions along the separation line at breakneck speed. This is a sign that they expect a Croatian offensive response very soon, which means that they are actually ignoring the repeated calls from Croatian political, diplomatic, and military officials for "energetic action" if Dubrovnik and the southern tip of Croatia continues to be bombarded from Trebinje.

For an efficient operation on the Dubrovnik front, the Croatian Army also needs (in addition to bringing in the 4th Elite Guards Brigade, tanks, and further artillery

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divisions) the support of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO]. Together, they will find it easier to penetrate the Serb defenses in the rocky eastern Herzegovinian terrain and advance further via Popovo Polje all the way to the gates of Trebinje. The seizure of Trebinje, indisputably the major Serb artillery stronghold in the region, will guarantee the safety of Dubrovnik and the repulsing (pushing back) of other Serb garrisons (from nearby villages) toward Bileca and Lake Bileca. Moreover, in keeping with the Split Agreement, the HVO and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army can exert concerted pressure on Stolac and Nevesinje, the strongholds of the so-called Herzegovina corps [of the Bosnian Serb military] whose entire theater of operation contains only seven below-strength infantry brigades, a below-strength armored brigade, and a mixed independent mechanized regiment.

Actually, "Duke" [chetnik title] Vucurevic (who is far better at using his teeth to open a bottle of Niksic beer [from Montenegro] and pulling the rope on a howitzer than at composing a single coherent sentence) is carrying out Karadzic's strategy: using the latest provocations to drag Serbia and Montenegro into the war at all costs and aiming to activate the Yugo-navy. However, he is doing this at the worst possible moment: At a time when Croatia is celebrating victory and becoming conscious of the strength and ability of its own armed forces.

Vucurevic is making a suicidal move.

UN: Executions, Possible Mass Graves in Krajina

AU1808153495 Paris AFP in English
1431 GMT 18 Aug 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Aug 18 (AFP)—Several cases of summary executions have been discovered in the Krajina region recently captured from rebel Croatian Serbs, the United Nations reported Friday [18 August].

"On the 16th of August, the UN discovered four dead bodies in the village of Zagrovic," UN spokesman Christopher Gunness said, adding that two had bullet wounds to the head. While denouncing the killings, Gunness refrained from implicating Croatian forces.

Two bodies were "dressed in underwear," he said. On one, the "right hand appeared to have been mutilated. Several fingers had been cut off."

"Away from the road there were two others corpses, one of a man about 50 years old, who was found lying outside his house, wrapped in a blanket with a bullet hole blasted in the back of his head," Gunness said. "The fourth corpse was in too advanced a stage of decomposition to allow the cause of death to be determined."

The UN spokesman also reported the discovery of what appeared to be mass graves at a Knin cemetery.

When UN civilian police were authorized to take the bodies to the cemetery in Knin, the former "capital" of the breakaway Croatian Serbs, they discovered "96 crosses that have been placed in opposite sides of four raised, flat top mounds," he said.

"The crosses are very close to one another and there are no individual mounds. Twenty crosses bear names. Despite the authorities' evident effort in preparing the site, the area gives the impression of a mass grave.

When a civilian police team attempted to investigate another suspected gravesite, they were fired on by a sniper, Gunness said. "The team had counted 22 new graves. Some were marked with crosses. Five bore names."

UN civil police "have also reported three more bodies, including one of a middle aged man in civilian dress lying in front of a burned house in Zvjerinac," Gunness said.

UNHCR: Krajina Serb Refugees Reach 162,000

AU1808120395 Paris AFP in English
1116 GMT 18 Aug 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Aug 18 (AFP)—The UN refugee agency said Friday that 162,000 Serbs fled the region of Krajina when it fell to Croatian forces early this month, and that the exodus is nearly complete.

The total number of refugees had been debated, with some estimates reaching 250,000 people. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) spokeswoman Christiane Berthiaume said the near-final total was 162,000 people.

Of that number, 7,000 are still at the stop-off point in the northern Bosnian town of Banja Luka, unable to travel on by themselves to join the mass influx into Serbia.

"They are old or handicapped, but they are going to be taken soon by bus to Serbia with the help of the local Red Cross," Berthiaume said.

A UNHCR delegate Thursday counted only 35 cars en route from Banja Luka to the Serbian border, she said.

Meanwhile, a humanitarian aid convoy was scheduled to leave Zagreb on Friday to bring food and water to 20,000 to 30,000 Bosnians loyal to Fikret Abdic, the rebel Moslem warlord who ruled a portion of the Bihac

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pocket in northwest Bosnia before it fell to government forces last month.

"They are hungry and there are cases of diarrhea," Berthiaume said. "They sleep in their cars, are tired and fear moreover being forced back to Bihac."

UNHCR said the group has the right to remain as refugees in Croatia but the agency needs additional information on whether they want to leave the country.

She added that sending aid and supplies to Sarajevo remains problematic.

"The air bridge has been interrupted since April 8, the Mount Igman road is dangerous, and we have only been able to send in 25 percent of what is needed in recent weeks, even though we must reach 200 percent ahead of the winter months," she said.

She said UNHCR was engaged in permanent negotiations with Bosnian Serb authorities who have not given sufficient security guarantees for the aid convoys.

Serb People's Party Leader: Exodus Is 'Genocide'

LD1708175995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1334 GMT 17 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Zagreb, 17 Aug (SRNA-BETA)—Milan Djukic, leader of the Serb People's Party, said today that around 300,000 Serbs had left Croatia before the attack on Krajina was carried out, while around 200,000 Serbs left Croatia after the attack.

Speaking at a news conference in Zagreb, Djukic said that between 90,000 and 100,000 Serbs remain in Croatia and that the exodus was the reason why his party did not support the Croatian Army action against Krajina.

"The Croatian Government refuses to recognize the existence of the Serb issue in Croatia; the Serb nation has now been reduced to 2 percent of the population, and now there is no reason why this issue should be raised at all," Djukic said.

He added that unless the Serbs return to their homes, it will no longer be possible to speak of ethnic cleansing, but about "a true genocide," and that the Serb People's Party will do everything to ensure that "perpetrators of crime in Croatia" are brought to justice before the international tribunal in The Hague. [passage omitted]

Article Sees Changed Status of Serb Minority

AU1808115795 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Aug 95 p 7

[Article by Olga Ramljak: "Minority Rights Remain the Same"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Operation Storm" did not only change the military situation and the ratio of free Croatian areas to the temporarily occupied ones, but also made some serious changes in demographic data. This will result in political moves, especially in the domain of minority rights.

The constitutional law on human rights and liberties and on the rights of ethnic and national communities or minorities in the Republic of Croatia gives special rights to ethnic and national communities or minorities that make up more than 8 percent of the population. Such a community has a right to districts [kotar] with special self-governmental (autonomous) status as well as to proportional representation in the parliament, government, and bodies of the supreme judicial authorities (Article 18 and 21). Croatia undertook to allow special international supervision over the implementation of the law in districts with special status and to form a human rights court on the basis of an agreement signed between all countries created on the territory of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia].

District areas were defined in Article 22 on the basis of the 1981 census as municipalities in which the Serbs were in the majority. The district of Knin comprises the following municipalities: Knin, Obrovac, Benkovac, Gracac, Titova Korenica, and Donji Lapac. The district of Glina is composed of the municipalities of Glina, Vrginmost, Hrvatska Kostajnica, Dvor na Uni, and Vojnic. According to the 1991 census, 194,469 people inhabited the said area, 21.6 percent of whom were Croats, 74.2 percent Serbs, i.e. there were 42,039 Croats and 144,340 Serbs. According to the same census, the Serbs from those 11 municipalities make up only 24.8 percent of the Serbs in Croatia.

Things are very different today, for this war, more than any other, was fought because a nation was deluded, so the Serbs from the area chose or were forced to choose to leave their own homeland. In the two districts, as well as in other liberated Croatian areas, members of the Serb ethnic community no longer make up 8 percent of the population, nor do they constitute a majority in any municipality. This reduces the need for special districts and special rights for ethnic community which makes up more than 8 percent of the population. In order to establish that, however, it will be necessary to conduct another census and to apply positive legal regulations to

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protect minority rights. In addition to complying with the obligations set by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (Article 134), it will also be necessary to comply with those set by Article 64 of the Constitutional Law: "No right that the Republic of Croatia took over or will take over in keeping with international agreements, indirectly or as a legal successor, will be changed or abolished, nor will their implementation be restricted."

High Level of Protection

Does Croatia have a right to change the Constitutional Law on minorities or will that be interpreted as a violation of minority and human rights, i.e. as a confirmation of ethnic cleansing, regardless of who is blamed for the act?

The Convention for the Protection of Minority Rights is the latest European document in the domain, and it grants Croatia the right to regulate the new situation by legal means. Article 30 of the convention says that a country can list the territories to which the convention regulations will apply and Item 3 of the article says: "Any statement, regarding any of the territories mentioned in the statement, made in keeping with the previous two items can be withdrawn by notifying the secretary general."

Consequently, the area of the two districts, even according to international norms, is divided among the already existing counties. There is no more justification for the proportional representation in authorities nor for the use of special election rules for ethnic communities that make up more than 8 percent of the population (Article 10 of the Law on Electing Deputies to the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia).

Does that mean that this interpretation reduces the rights of the Serb ethnic community in Croatia? In what way will their minority rights be protected, how will the conditions for preserving the main components of their authenticity be improved, and will they be equal before the law?

The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, as the basic law, explicitly protects the equality of all its citizens, without discrimination on any basis, nationality included. The already attained rights in promoting and protecting the authenticity of national minorities in Croatia are at an enviable level and no new norm can go below that level. The Serb community, just as all other communities in Croatia, has a right to cultural autonomy, use of its own language and alphabet, a separate part of the education program, participation in authorities, access to the media, the forming of associations, and gathering. Article 21 of the European Convention, which determines that "nothing in the Convention shall be interpreted as to imply any right to any activity or act in violation of the basic principles of the international law, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and political independence of the state," applies to the Serb as well to all other communities. On the other hand, the state of Croatia is obliged by Article 16: "Parties will abstain from taking measures that disturb the population ratio in areas populated by members of national minorities that aim to restrict the rights and liberties as granted by the Convention."

No More Districts

In other words, minority rights remain the same, only the will and actions of members of the Serb community brought about a situation in which they are no longer members of a privileged minority. The parliament will have to have its say on that as well, so that the Constitutional Law on minority rights will finally be included on the agenda, as the Serb National Party [SNS] requested a long time ago.

Deputies will not vote to expand district areas with autonomous status to more than 30 municipalities, however, as the SNS demanded, but to do away with the regulation on districts altogether.

The problem must be dealt with fairly and delicately, observing the practice of mutual tolerance and respect, lawfulness and facts, bearing in mind the fact that Croatia went much further than the formulation of the European Convention that talks about "taking measures when necessary," "as much as it is possible," and "whenever relevant." The speedy and effective establishment of civilian authorities, the economic development of the liberated areas, and respect for human and minority rights in every corner of Croatia for all its citizens will be most important.

Ethnic Cleansing Proceeds in Krajina, Vojvodina

BR1808114295 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 14 Aug 95 pp 1, 5

[Article by Frank Westerman: "'Ethnic Cleansing' of Krajina and Vojvodina"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Kukujevci, 14 Aug—In Krajina, Croats have started to eliminate the traces of the Serbs who have fled. In Knin, their houses are being systematically set on fire. In Serbia, an "ethnic house exchange" agency is trying to exchange the houses of "ethnically cleansed" Serbs from Croatia for those of "ethnically cleansed" Croats from Serbia.

"Swallow" Works in Ethnic House Exchanges

"What I do is not what you call a usual business," says Mileva Stegie, a broker in ethnic house exchanges. On

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her sitting room table are document files of what is on offer: Summer houses by the sea, chalet-type farms, a sheep pen. The owners of this property, Serbs from Croatia, are looking for similar possessions belonging to Croats in Serbia. Stegie, the mediator, brings those changing their country together.

In the summer of 1991, the 38-year-old accountant herself exchanged her flat in Zagreb for a forge and house in Kukujevci, a village in Serbia with a pompous Catholic church. Swallow Agency is written on the facade. In four years, Stegie's company has mediated in "the exchange of 500 of the 660 houses" in Kukujevci alone. A Serbian flag now hangs from nearly every balcony and pole. Not because there is something to celebrate, but to prevent misunderstandings. Here and there "occupied" is written on the sort of boards where farmers normally sell eggs or cherries. The warning is intended for displaced people from Krajina, who enter the village in a procession of tractors. So that they do not throw a Serb out of his house by accident. [passage omitted]

Swallow refuses to help in compulsory expulsions from homes. "We only mediate in the exchange of houses," Stegie said. Since the influx of Krajina Serbs, Kukujevci's last Croats have been on her books as well.

"It is a madhouse, They all want to leave at the same time," said the broker. A moment later she spoke busily in a cordless phone: Could she get hold of extra moving vans?

On her office wall there is a map of the former Yugoslavia with a large number of long arrows which point from Kukujevci to Dubrovnik, Split, Zadar, and Zagreb, as if they were the destinations of an airline. But there is a difference. Swallow sells one-way tickets only. "I take the people in a civilized way to the places where they belong," the owner says.

There will only be a chance of peace in the Balkans when the "ethnic cleansing" is completely finished, Stegie predicts. When all Croats live to the west of the dividing line and all Serbs to the east. "Why should we have to strive for a multiethnic state? No one wants that," she said. "It is much better to draw clear borders."

Just as the young Croatian republic is a "state of Croats" according to the constitution, similarly the constantly repeated call for a "Serbia exclusively for the Serbs" is heard in Belgrade. The question is: Where will the border between the two come to lie? According to the sketch which Croatian President Tudjman drew on a menu in May, eventually an S-shaped border will run through the Balkans. Bosnia does not appear on his map. [passage omitted]

Even the police force, on which the Milosevic regime leans heavily, is finding it difficult to implement its duties. In Kukujevci Goran, aged 28, said that he had had to seize weapons from fellow countrymen during the whole week. He also has to take badges of the "Serb Republic of Krajina"—the country no longer exists. "It is because I wear this police uniform," said Goran. "Otherwise I would not cooperate."

Together with three colleagues, he has been deployed to prevent expulsions from homes in Kukujevci or, if necessary, to reverse them. But he refuses to use violence against the Serbian refugees. "If they give those Croats the keys to their houses in Krajina, then as far as I am concerned they can go ahead," said Goran.

Stegie does not agree. She wants to help the last Croats in a "fair exchange." The price list hangs on the wall behind her: 20 dinars (10 guilders) for registration, 50 for a declaration in which the participant gives up his property in Serbia, 150 for drawing up a contract. The rest of her income varied from "a carton of cigarettes to 1 percent of the value of the house" depending on the customer's ability to pay. The accountant may run an unusual little company, but it remains business as usual.

Poll: Support for Tudjman as President for Life

AU1808120695 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 11 Aug 95 p 12

["Poll conducted for GLOBUS by Snjezana Beros's team": "Every Fifth Croat Thinks Tudjman Should Be Appointed Lifetime President!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Franjo Tudjman, commander of the Croatian Army and president of the country, having received the first reports on the success of "Operation Storm," was presented in the media as "the most deserving of the most deserving," as "a man whom nothing will stop...."

A Croatian Television report shown on 7 August, i.e. the day Tudjman visited Knin immediately after it was liberated, shows that the first of Tudjman's political posters—showing the president smiling and the (election?) slogan: "Franjo Tudjman, the man who wins"—arrived in Knin together with the Croatian Army and the police.

Amid the feeling of elation, the idea explicitly being offered to the public that of appointing Tudjman as lifetime president almost went unnoticed. That same day, on 7 August, the president met with former refugees in Knin. One of them, obviously very excited, struggled to get through to President Tudjman and cheered in front of the cameras: "Lifetime president! Lifetime president!"

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Was the cheer of the overjoyed refugee just a metaphor, or is it really that the undemocratic idea of appointing Franjo Tudjman as lifetime president has started to evolve in the Croatian public?

A poll conducted for GLOBUS by Snjezana Beros's team on a sample of 900 people reveals a sensational piece of information—as many as 20.5 percent of people interviewed said that parliament should appoint Tudjman as lifetime president; 37.1 percent think Tudjman should be president as many times as he wants and for as long as his health allows; while only 36.9 percent were in favor of the solution provided by the Constitution, i.e. that he can only run for president one more time.

The long-term undemocratic socialist experience with Tito as lifetime president is still ingrained in Croatian citizens. The state media, however, never get tired of presenting President Tudjman as the one and only, infallible and irreplaceable.

Furthermore, the military "Operation Storm" increased the trust in the military might of the Croatian Army—as many as 62.4 percent think eastern Slavonia will be liberated in a military action.

Even possible operations by the Croatian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina enjoy the support of the Croatian public, at least in this stage of newly formed self-confidence—55.3 percent support liberation actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina!

HDZ May Call Elections 'Early This Fall'

AU1708193795 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 16 Aug 95 p 5

[Commentary by Nenad Bunjac: "Battling To Win the Elections"; all quotation marks as published]

[FBIS Translated Text] People say that one must strike while the iron is hot and, regardless of Flaubert, who claims that sayings are "graveyards of generalities and human stupidity," we see this piece of wisdom being put into practice during the daily propaganda activities of "the leader and party for all times—the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ]," which would not dream of missing its golden opportunity to capitalize on the staggering achievements of "Operation Storm" in liberating Croatia's occupied areas with one goal only: to "cement" victory at the elections. The feeble cry of Croatia's political opposition that "Operation Storm" was "a victory of all Croats, not only of the HDZ" is fading beneath a cacophony of patriotic songs, machine-gun rounds fired into the air, and enlightening speeches by "the man who wins," while all appeals of the Croatian intelligentsia for calm judgment and analysis of the post-Storm situation are counterbalanced by Freundlich-Tudjen-like [Croatian commentary writers] exaggerated praise, which pushes all the previous mistakes of the ruling party under "a fat carpet of national liberation" and condescendingly reproves "all those who did not trust in us." Of course, we have not seen the end of the forceful lobotomy of the "left cerebral hemisphere" of Croatia's politics being lit up by the flashing sign that was recently placed in Osijek: "HDZ," "Flash," [operation to liberate western Slavonia] "Storm," "???" But there are far more question marks than the sign was ever intended to raise. Indeed, what lies in store for us now that the sun has set on "Operation Storm"?

First of all, we are closer to the elections than we think, as they are most likely to take place early this fall. They will be postponed only in the event of a sharp and inconvenient reversal on the Croatian political scene. In order to avoid "something like that," a meticulous analysis of the Croatian political reality shows three prominent orientations of present Croatian policy: The first uses the controlled media to create such electoral and political tension that will pave the way for early elections before the frail Croatian economy falters again, this time in trying to rebuild the recently occupied areas. The Government of the Republic of Croatia estimates that it would take approximately a billion dollars for the most basic repairs of the devastated economic and residential potentials in these newly liberated Croatian areas. And that given the present stabilization policy that seems "but a dream." Even if, by some miracle, through somewhat uncertain foreign credit, we managed to procure the funds, we would be facing another problem: What partners and professionals would effect it? Although the Croatian Government has already issued decrees trying to restore and reestablish the state administration in those areas, "the lawyers, doctors, and economists" are reluctant to leave the urban areas and venture forth to the ravaged parts of Croatia and a social tension is brewing up that will not be confined by a media blockade or by bureaucratic dictates.

The second guideline aims to stabilize the status of Croatia on the international scene by means of a temporary isolationist policy, which has been in the offing for a while, and there are visible signs, from "the pushing aside" of the efforts of an embarrassingly moral and prominently political ambassador in the person of Peter Galbraith to "consider Croatia a political partner of all major world powers," to the ignoring of all the peace initiatives of European forces, "which we now need like a hole in the head." And the third guideline boils down to silently ending the unfinished job on the ground and, together with the forces of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council, establishing

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a firm defense line along Glamoc-Drvar-Bihac, which would release significant Croatian forces from those areas that could then be sent to the potential battlefield in eastern Slavonia. Until then, we will "pursue the quest for a solution by diplomatic means and negotiations."

The Croatian political leadership is putting all this to a test that carries unforeseen political consequences, for "some may well ask why our army is lingering on the battlefield, why the rebuilding is taking so long; we could even be asked about the status of the 150,000 'gently removed' Krajina citizens, and, by God, it could also happen that we are not recognized by the so-called Yugoslavia in the near future." That is why the HDZ is not very likely to risk it and so will—in the euphoric atmosphere of the forthcoming return of the refugees, the rebuilding and reestablishment of the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia in the liberated areas—rush into what is likely to be an easy and convincing election victory. The defectiveness of the above analysis of those ambitions matches the tendency of Croatian politicians to "kick and spill the bucket of milk," while the sterilized opposition is not acting like a political force that could obstruct the HDZ's intentions to call the elections. Ergo, there is only one question: When will the elections take place? Like to bet? The end of October....

Financing of Political Parties Analyzed

95BA0304A Zagreb BANKA in Serbo-Croatian Jul 95 pp 7-8

[Unattributed article: "Politics and Finance: Next Elections More Expensive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Croatian Peasants Party would perhaps be the richest party if denationalization were implemented in Croatia, but for now the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] is the financial Goliath; money circulates throughout Croatian politics almost without restriction, and everyone has as much as they can procure.*

Because it is expected that new elections in Croatia will be held in June of next year, political parties are already now beginning to concern themselves with financing the election campaign. Those who aspire to victory will have to spend a great deal.

The financing of parties in Croatia is regulated by the Law on Political Parties of August 1993, which is very liberal compared to many countries. All the sources for financing political parties known around the world are permitted, and the inflow of funds from abroad is not restricted, nor are there limits on the revenues and spending of the party machinery.

Parties represented in the Assembly receive a certain amount of funding from the national budget. Aside from the amount of 24 percent of the gross base for the payroll of workers and officials employed by state bodies, which is the same for everyone, the parties also receive money proportional to their number of representatives in the Assembly.

Hard Base

For the majority of parties, however, the budget is a minor source of money. Josip Leko, business manager of the Social Democratic Party of Croatia [SDP], says that one-third of all expenditures is covered by party dues (10,000 members pay monthly dues of 10 kunas), that 15 to 20 percent of the needed money is received from the national and zupanija budgets, and that one-third is covered by revenues from renting out the building at Iblerov Square 9 in Zagreb, where the party headquarters is located. Annual revenues from the lease total around 450,000 German marks [DM].

The SDP additionally financed the 1992 election campaign through sponsorships and three-month, short-term loans. The sponsors were private entrepreneurs, and there was also outside financing. The campaign cost around DM100,000, Leko says. It was cheap because voters were approached in the field. But in the coming campaign, more than half a million German marks would have to go to television advertising alone. Leko says that the campaign will be financed through sponsorship, loans, and a more advantageous lease on the building.

The majority of other parties could envy the SDP's finances. Not only did it preserve some of the privileges of the party from which it originated; it also held on to apartments, so that it is earning money from selling them off. Thus far, the SDP has sold around 350 apartments.

The manager tells us that there are 14 professionals working for the party throughout Croatia. The largest amount of money is spent on travel and per diem expenses as well as publicity. The SDP owns no companies. It did own Markt-export, which in practice never did anything.

The main source of financing of the Croatian Social-Liberal Party [HSLS], says its secretary general, Bozo Kovacevic, is the national budget and the budgets of local level governments. In 1993 the HSLS took power in many major Croatian cities, and that is reflected in both money and political power on the local level. Overall budget funding brings in around 100,000 kunas a month. The HSLS distributes the funding provided by zupanija councils or municipal assemblies in such a way that 35 percent of the money goes to the Zagreb

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(national) headquarters, while 65 percent remains with the local branches.

Political Investments

Donations are another source of financing and are especially important in the preelection period. The majority of this comes from small donors who support the party with several hundred marks, but there have also been some individual contributions of several tens of thousands of marks. In the 1992 elections, one major donation was made conditional on a high-ranking position on the party's national list. Kovacevic says that this happened only once, and the Grand Council of the HSLS gave the green light for that sort of "compensation."

The 1992 elections for the House of Representatives and for president cost the HSLS "a little less than DM500,000." Kovacevic says that that is several dozen times less than the HDZ spent! If they want to compete with the HDZ in the next elections, then they will have to spend much more. The leadership must still decide on how to raise money for the next elections.

The HSLS's company, Link, has not been in operation for two years now, but they intend to get it going again. They have no real estate, and headquarters in Zagreb does not rely on member dues. All dues remain with the local branches. Politicians work in the party on a volunteer basis; there is no per diem for traveling around Croatia, but the party pays for hotel accommodations and gasoline.

The Croatian Peasants Party [HSS] would perhaps be the richest party if denationalization were implemented in Croatia, says HSS secretary general Predrag Haramija. For now, it is—hopefully only temporarily—a poor party with a relatively poor membership. The HSS headquarters is at Zvonimirova 17, in a building erected in 1937 with money earned by members by collecting scrap iron and paper. This collectivist spirit, whereby the members help the party (but it also helps them) is preserved by two associations. Economic Unity is a farmers cooperative with 9,000 members. According to Haramija, the HSS helps Economic Unity with its infrastructure, providing farmers with cheaper production materials and helping them to market their products. The HSS secretary general says that the goal is not to earn a profit, but rather to help the farmers. In fact, the market inspection service has concluded that the association is evading the payment of tax on acquired production materials, but the findings have been "misplaced" somewhere in the government's desk drawers. Farmers Unity, an association concerned with cultural and educational activities, is not as interesting in this regard. The party's company, Dom, operates on meager earnings.

The HSS secretary general emphasizes that in the coming election campaign it will have to spend at least half a million marks, all the more so because the media are more closed to the opposition than they were three years ago. The main source of HSS funding is the regular membership dues. The party has 32,000 members, and as many as 80 percent pay dues, which many other parties cannot boast. The party saves as much as it can, so that there is no compensation for travel expenses. "Poverty gives the party freedom, enthusiasm, and vigor," says Haramija.

Long Live Freedom

Slovene political science professor Dr. Stane Kranjc estimates that on average at least 30 percent of party money is not subject to public oversight. There is no reason to believe that this percentage is any less in Croatia. We noted that Croatian law does not restrict the inflow of money, but it is interesting that none of the most influential parties is calling for a more restrictive law. All of them will apply their own ingenuity in the new competition for voter approval in order to achieve a better position, and for those with lesser ambitions entering parliament will provide material security until the next race.

Naturally, the HDZ is a financial Goliath compared to other parties, and the opposition occasionally expresses the suspicion that it is deriving financial benefits from its connections with state institutions. Financial strength is important, especially on the eve of elections, but it is not always decisive. But the question of what all influences a voter's decision is the subject of another analysis.

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Jewish Official Critical of U.S. Brokering

WS1808121895 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 18 Aug 95 p 2

[Report by "CEG": "Politics; Visit by Knesset Chairman; About Jewish Property Without Participation of Third Countries"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *During the "Puls Dnia" television program, Jewish Parliament Chairman Szewach Weiss, on a private visit to Poland, dissociated himself from the U.S. Administration's pressure on the Polish Government as regards the return of Jewish property.*

Knesset Chairman Szewach Weiss yesterday met with President Lech Walesa. Due to the private nature of the guest's stay, the politicians provided no comments after the meeting. The presidential press office only said that they addressed Polish-Jewish relations.

Weiss met with Prime Minister Josef Oleksy as well. It is known that, among other issues, they discussed the return of Jewish property. During yesterday's "Puls Dnia," the Knesset head dissociated himself from the pressure exerted by the U.S. Congress with regard to the return of property.

Let us recall that two months ago influential U.S. congressmen sent President Clinton a letter demanding that the issue be settled by the Polish authorities. The U.S. Administration quickly sent its representative to Poland, who attempted to talk our authorities into doing so. Szewach Weiss believes, however, that the issue of Jewish property should be settled between Poland and Israel, without the participation of third countries.

The Polish Government recently adopted a draft law on the state's stance on Jewish religious communities, which is supposed to resolve the problem. The government draft envisions that decisions on the return of property will be made by the Office of the Council of Ministers head. Jews will only be able to claim property they owned before 8 May 1945 and lost during the German occupation, or which was confiscated by the communist authorities.

The law envisions that only such religious property as synagogues, cemeteries, religious schools, or ritual baths will be returned. By virtue of the bill, property of individuals will not be returned. This issue could only be resolved by a reprivatization bill, but all its drafts considered by Sejm envision return or compensation only for current Polish citizens.

Aide Criticizes 'Party Game' Over Election

LD1808091495 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0628 GMT 18 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 18 August (PAP)—Presidential spokesman Leszek Spalinski described as a "party game" Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy's appeal yesterday to Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych to announce the date of presidential elections as soon as possible. Speaking on Polish radio, Leszek Spalinski said that the issue of extending President Walesa's term of office was raised by left-wing politicians because they thought the circumstances were expedient.

Lech Walesa's spokesman revealed that Prime Minister Oleksy was one of the politicians who, in the past few months, consulted the president and put forward various proposals in this matter. Spalinski added that finding the author of the proposal to defer presidential elections by two years would now be very difficult.

Police Decry Election Campaigning at Stations

WS1708133195 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 17 Aug 95 p 1

[Article by Jerzy Jachowicz: "Superczynski: There Will Be No Petty Formalities; The Policemen's President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Signatures in support of Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] presidential candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski were collected in several police headquarters in Warsaw. The police authorities reacted sharply.*

The most energetic campaigner at the Warsaw Police Headquarters was an officer of the operational-reconnoitering division. In the headquarters in the Srodmiescie and Mokotow districts the canvassers were middle-ranking officers. For encouragement, the campaigners handed out small calendars (6 by 9 cm) for the second half of 1995. On the back cover was a picture of Kwasniewski in a green, checkered jacket, with the word "Greetings!" and the SLD candidate's autograph at the level of his tie. "It is as if he tried to cheer us up in the difficult battle against crime," said our interlocutor.

A flier (15 by 20 cm) was also distributed with a picture showing Kwasniewski with a bouquet of red tulips in his lap and the inscription: "President '95." On the back side were two slogans: "Let us choose the future!" and "Let us choose Aleksander Kwasniewski!" followed by an appropriate c.v. of the candidate.

General Jerzy Stanczyk, chief of Polish police, told us yesterday that the collection of signatures violates the Law on Police—which provides for the noninvolvement

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of police officers in politics. Although the law directly prohibits police officers only from entering any political parties, Stanczyk explained that the interior minister used it as the basis for issuing an instruction prohibiting election campaigns from being carried out at police units.

[Interior] Minister Andrzej Milczanowski issued that restriction before the parliamentary elections in 1993, but, as Stanczyk emphasized, it remains effective to this day. "Campaigning is thus inadmissible at police headquarters, and the collection of signatures is unpardonable."

Chief of Warsaw Police Arnold Superczynski is also outraged by our information. "There will be no petty formalities. As soon as I find out who did this, the perpetrator will be severely punished. If it turns out that any of the heads of district police headquarters or a head of any of the divisions at Warsaw Police Headquarters knew about this, they will have to resign from office."

Confirm Signatures Were Collected

WS1808110795 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 18 Aug 95 p 1

[Report by "JACH": "Election Campaigning in the Police; Superczynski Wants To Fire People"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The head of the Warsaw police forces confirmed yesterday our information that signatures supporting the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] leader were collected among police functionaries in Warsaw.*

This is what Arnold Superczynski told GAZETA WYBORCZA: "In some police stations functionaries did collect signatures supporting Aleksander Kwasniewski, which was a violation of the principle in line with which police should be nonpolitical. Yesterday Superczynski set up a commission to check out these 'facts.' If they are borne out, he will take disciplinary action against the agitators and their superiors and dismiss them. The police chief called the agitation 'an electoral guerrilla warfare' and did not rule out that it was an organized action.'"

We also know, unofficially, that Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW] Head Andrzej Milczanowski yesterday sent officers of the WSW Control and Supervision Inspectorate to the Warsaw police headquarters.

Meanwhile, SLD Spokesman Zbigniew Siemiatkowski declared that the agitation took place without the knowledge and approval of Kwasniewski's election staff.

Gen Wilecki on Reports of Campaigning for Walesa

WS1808110595 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 17 Aug 95 p 3

[Report by "KRZEM": "Wilecki: Somebody Is Trying To Stir Up Conflict Between the Top and the Bottom in the Armed Forces; The Draftee Has Problems"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

Certain Passions

Reporters asked [Chief of Staff] General Wilecki about an item carried by yesterday's GAZETA WYBORCZA claiming that his deputy, General Leon Komornicki, visited a garrison in Szczecin where he persuaded officers to vote for Lech Walesa in the presidential elections. Komornicki also criticized the Democratic Left Alliance-Polish Peasant Party government, stating that it is only thanks to the efforts of Wilecki and Walesa that the cadres got huge pay raises this year. "If Walesa wins, there will be more such raises in future," the general is alleged to have said.

"I have noted nothing of the sort," Wilecki said. "I will investigate the issue, although I do not see any violation of the law or any affair here. I do not intend to enter into an argument with GAZETA WYBORCZA and comment on the facts or the various forms of manipulation."

He explained: "We enlist new draftees four times a year. They come to the Armed Forces with certain passions and attitudes, just like all young citizens of our country. They raise certain problems at meetings with cadres. I myself, as well as my deputies, are asked about various things. One can speak openly on such issues in a democratic state."

The Government Gave the Raises

The general was most disturbed about the reports on the pay raises: "Financial issues in the Armed Forces are regulated on the basis of the budget and government decisions. Salaries were raised in the first quarter of this year and now again in midyear. The law was not violated in any way. The salaries of a particular group of state cadres were raised. In the Armed Forces, this group made up for 0.7 percent of the cadres. Anyone who says 'look how much money the general's got' is trying to stir up a conflict between the top and the bottom."

It is worth remembering that the higher cadres received a 66-percent salary increase, while the lower ranking ones received 13 percent.

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Civilian Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka added: "Thus far, we have been dealing with press facts. We have to verify them and state how far this so-called campaigning reached, if it did exist at all."

He repeated after his superior, Zbigniew Okonski, that if reports on political activity and electoral campaigning within the Armed Forces are confirmed, those involved will be held responsible.

Control Over Armed Forces, Defense System Viewed

WS1708124095 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 14-15 Aug 95 p 8

[Interview with Deputy Jerzy Szmajdzinski, Sejm Defense Commission Chairman, by Ewa Rosolak; place and date not given: "Civilian Joint Responsibility, not Control"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Rosolak] What does civilian control over the Armed Forces mean in the Third Republic of Poland?

[Szmajdzinski] It means that a democratically elected parliament, a government formed by this parliament, and a civilian national defense minister are responsible for the Armed Forces, and for the economic and legal conditions of defense system operations—the most important element of which are the Armed Forces.

[Rosolak] Does this control, which is natural in Western democracies, have its opponents in our country?

[Szmajdzinski] It does not have opponents. Instead, the problem lies in the differences in understanding of what civilian control over the Armed Forces means and should manifest in practice.

I believe that, in the Polish context, we should talk about civilian and democratic responsibility instead of control. This is partly because some parts of the military still interpret this control as an investigation. Part of the cadre does not want to understand that it is not allowed to allocate taxpayers' money—even for such an important purpose as providing state security and maintaining structures necessary for guaranteeing this security—without taxpayers' representatives specifying the main tasks and basic directions. A taxpayer and parliamentary group representing him must have insight into where money goes and whether this is a justifiable purchase or not. Those who receive public funds always need to be ready to explain and account for the usefulness of the expenditures, particularly since the issues relating to defense and the Armed Forces have become more public only recently; now they are public in the same way as in democratic countries.

[Rosolak] Do the civilian taxpayers' representatives controlling the Armed Forces encounter impediments from the military?

[Szmajdzinski] Sometimes, yes. This comes from the weak economic system of the Armed Forces and not quite clear budget, including the expenditure accounts. Contrary to expectations, the military does not oppose actions which guarantee an apolitical Armed Forces, even those that completely eliminate the Armed Forces from politics.

[Rosolak] The behavior of some military figures, General Lewinski for example, contradict your opinion.

[Szmajdzinski] This is true. There are servicemen who decided to engage in politics; for instance, the Armed Forces structures were supporting a political group starting in the 1993 elections. This is a documented fact.

[Rosolak] Are they not forgiven by their support of the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms?

[Szmajdzinski] Naturally, a serviceman may have political likings and political views. He may not, however, use Armed Forces structures for political aims. Commanders employing the military commit an evident political act which should not take place, because it disqualifies Poland as a democratic country with apolitical armed forces.

No preelection "information" meetings should take place in the Armed Forces. In addition, in-house military bulletins or briefings systems are not a forum for conveying political suggestions or instructions. What an officer does away from the barracks—whether he goes to sign the list of support for Walesa or Kwasniewski—is his business. Nevertheless, there should be no pressure to follow orders such as going to a church or to election headquarters.

[Rosolak] Perhaps, the apolitical armed forces choose a political patron because they are afraid of the other forces' influence.

[Szmajdzinski] I think this anxiety is groundless. Poland has a good constitutional solution that requires consent and cooperation of the president, prime minister and the minister connected to the Armed Forces' General Staff. Rotating parliaments cannot independently conduct political changes because this requires the consent of the most important centers of power. According to the Constitution, we guarantee noninvolvement of the Armed Forces in politics. In practice, however, various incidents occur.

[Rosolak] Today, which issues depend on the military?

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[Szmajdzinski] The military are the primary advisers and experts on all issues relating to military affairs. The military as a structure, however, cannot decide about the Armed Forces' size, the budget's volume, or the state's political system. Every serviceman, exercising his democratic rights, participates in the elections or referendums. He can express his likings and views in democratic actions. However, the military structure should not speak for political and regime matters, as is the case in the entire democratic world. This does not mean that the military should not define its needs. Still, the decision belongs to the public representatives chosen in democratic elections and to democratic governments.

[Rosolak] This was different before....

[Szmajdzinski] Indeed. The Polish People's Army was determining its needs and tasks on its own, and this was indisputable. Today, decisions are being made in a different way. Armed Forces' commanders were accustomed to their opinions being unquestionable and the only one. The situation has changed. The military has to understand that one cannot both speak about building democratic armed forces and integrating with European military and political structures, and on the other hand, behave in the old way.

[Rosolak] What does the Commission for National Defense do at the present moment?

[Szmajdzinski] It creates legal conditions for the functioning of the defense system, including the Armed Forces. After several years of legislative standstill, new solutions will enter the parliament [as published]. Secondly, another important issue concerns creating economic conditions for the defense system. The third priority is to raise awareness, as well as to explore and form instruments of parliamentary control over the Armed Forces. Today, this issue is carried out primarily by the civilian national defense minister.

[Rosolak] You have a lot of work ahead of you....

[Szmajdzinski] This is natural, for Poland is just beginning to form mechanisms of civilian and democratic responsibility for the defense system and the Armed Forces. For instance, it will take a while until we learn to compile a clear budget in accordance with the standards in democratic countries. This will take a few more years.

[Rosolak] Thank you for the conversation.

Arms Reduced Within Treaty Ahead of Schedule

WS1708144595 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 17 Aug 95 p 2

[Report by "KRZEM": "Arms Reduction: Death to the Tanks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Poland has already destroyed 1,025 T-55 tanks, 701 guns with a caliber of more than 100 mm, and 54 fighter planes – more than 90 percent of what was provided for in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty. The reduction of Polish arms will be completed by 14 September, two months before the deadline. Apart from us, only Germany has fulfilled the CFE requirements ahead of schedule. The agreement, signed in November 1990 in Paris by 22 states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, provided for destroying 50,000 tanks, carriers, planes, etc. on both sides. According to the CFE, the Polish Armed Forces can possess: 1,730 tanks, 2,150 armored vehicles, 1,610 guns with a caliber of more than 100 mm, 460 fighter planes, and 130 helicopter gunships.

Silesian German Leader Hopes for 'Free Settlement'

MM1808101495 Szczecin GLOS SZCZECINSKI in Polish 10 Aug 95 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Expellees' Union Hopes To Cooperate With Polish Organizations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Paul Latousek, deputy president of the All-German Expellees' Union (BdV), in Silesia on a working visit, has expressed an interest in cooperation with Polish social and political organizations. Latousek revealed that the Expellees' Union for some time had been conducting talks with Polish political organizations with a view to initiating such cooperation, although so far these negotiations had yielded no notable results. "If Poland wants to join Europe, it must adjust its standards to those of the EU, and these include the right to free settlement. Within the framework of such changes, which will eventually extend to the disappearance of state borders, we also perceive a chance for German people to return to their Heimat," Latousek said.

Ministry Reports No Pay Raise for Public Sector

WS1808122195 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 17 Aug 95 p 1

[Article by Maciej Fischer: "Did Kolodko Promise the Public Sector the Moon?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Polish Finance Ministry has said that the public sector will not receive an additional

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pay raise, scheduled for October, as promised by Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko.

The budget will receive no additional revenues on which Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko based his promise. Therefore, there will be no possibility to implement the agreement concluded by the government and trade unions to allocate additional funds for wages in the public sector, Deputy Finance Minister Elzbieta Chojna-Duch said yesterday. She added that many independent economists approached by the Finance Ministry for their opinion thought that the deputy prime minister made a mistake deciding in favor of the additional wage hikes.

According to the previously reached agreement, wages in the public sector were to be raised 6 percent above inflation. In the opinion of the deputy finance minister, the situation can develop according to three possible scenarios: The agreement will be renegotiated; public sphere employees will receive one-time payments that would be excluded from the base to be used in calculations of wage increases for the next year; or, wages will be raised this fall on condition that the next-year increases will be rather marginal. Negotiations on this issue are expected to start soon.

Meanwhile, Aleksandra Jakubowska, spokeswoman for the government, assured that the raise will definitely be introduced, while the negotiations will concentrate on its "implementation phase."

Daewoo To Invest $1.1 Billion in Automobile Plant

WS1808074295

[FBIS Editorial Report] On 17 August, GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish publishes a 250-word front-page report, signed by "HAN, QUB," which states that the Korean concern Daewoo signed a letter of intent on 16 August with the Warsaw-based FSO automobile plant. The Korean promise to invest $1.1 billion by the year 2001 and produce 220,000 cars annually would make this the largest foreign investment in Poland to date. According to the report: "The initial agreement provides that Daewoo will take a 60 percent stake in FSO, the remaining 40 percent would be distributed among employees, the State Treasury, and Polmot Holding—the company that sells Daewoo cars in Poland. Our sources claim the letter of intent specifies that the transaction is to be finalized by the end of October." The report adds: "Only 20-40 percent of parts are to be imported. It is also said that Daewoo has promised to retain the current level of employment—FSO employs over 20,000 people. Daewoo is also promising that, if it becomes the owner of FSO, it will increase its declared investments in the automobile plant in Lublin from $340 million to $740 million." The report cites Iwona Jaworska from the Government Press Office as saying, "The signing of the letter of intent does not mean that Daewoo has been granted exclusivity rights for entering negotiations in taking over FSO."

The report is followed by a 100-word commentary by Andrzej Kublik. The author points out that this is one in a long series of letters of intent which FSO has signed. He wonders why Daewoo wants to invest in the antiquated FSO plant when $1 billion would suffice to build a new factory. He also asks why Daewoo is claiming it will employ a workforce of 20,000 if modern car plants today employ 4,000-5,000. Kublik states: "If someone offers more than $1 billion, he wants something in return. What tax and customs abatements is Daewoo counting on?", and adds: "Daewoo is speaking of producing approximately 200,000 cars in Romania, dozens of thousands of trucks in the Czech Republic. Now it is Poland's turn, with 220,000 cars and some 100,000 trucks. Where in Europe will the Koreans market that many cars, especially since they continue to manufacture cars only through licensing agreements and do not have any experience in large-scale manufacturing of cars anywhere outside Korea."

On 17 August ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish carries a 250-word front-page commentary by Roman Stefanski entitled "Enter the 'Tigers'?" It states that the experience of international car manufacturers indicate that the huge amount of capital that Daewoo wants to invest in Poland could be multiplied several times in over ten years. "This could be reflected in an accelerated development of many branches of the economy, from the mining, steel, energy, chemical, and fuel industries up to manufacturers of various small products or even gadgets used in cars," asserts Stefanski. He points out that most important is the fact that the fate of one of our largest companies—the FSO automobile plant—depends on the success of the Daewoo venture. He says: "It seems that this time the specific Far Eastern determination of the Korean partner who managed to lead to the signing of the letter of intent in under two weeks time eliminates the risk of bankruptcy that has been hovering over the plant for years." The author concludes his commentary by saying: "One huge advantage—particularly for car purchasers—will be the creation of a counterbalance to Fiat Auto Poland, which has thus far dominated our car market."

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Federal

Milosevic, Holbrooke Continue Talks in Belgrade

AU1808103295 Paris AFP in English 0925 GMT 18 Aug 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug 18 (AFP)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke resumed their talks early Friday in the presidential palace here.

Milosevic broke off discussions on a U.S. peace initiative for Bosnia after five hours Thursday for a surprise meeting with European Union mediator Carl Bildt, who made an unscheduled stopover in Belgrade, now the centre of frenetic activity as diplomats focus on Milosevic's response to the U.S. initiative.

The Serbian leader was due to meet Spanish Foreign Minister Javier Solana in the afternoon along with European Union (EU) foreign relations commissioner Hans Van Der Broek. Later he will have talks with Greek foreign minister Karolos Papoulias.

While the content of the talks with the US delegation have not been revealed, their duration and Bildt's unsheduled arrival Thursday for what Holbrooke told reporters was "an urgent meeting" with Milosevic, has been interpreted optimistically here.

The two men discussed "creating conditons to move the peace process forward and achieve a peace plan," a government spokesman said.

It is clear that the American plan has won some support within the Bosnian Serb camp in Pale.

The Bosnian Serb "speaker of parliament" Momcilo Krajisnik said in Pale Wednesday that the international community was now prepared to meet "minimum Serb demands."

He said the latest proposals would enable the Serbs to consolidate a compact territory, allowing a broader link between the western and eastern parts of the self-declared Bosnian Serb republic, without enclaves and with access to the sea. Speculation has surrounded a possible deal ceding the Moslem enclave of Gorazde to the Serbs in return for Serb-held territory around the beseiged Bosnian capital Sarajevo.

Krajisnik was speaking after talks in Geneva with Bildt and his International Conference on Former Yugosalvia co-chairman, Thorvald Stoltenberg.

The high-powered American delegation—which includes US "contact group" representative Robert Frasure as well as State Department, Pentagon and White House officials—will thus far be encouraged by the response of the Pale leadership, for so long the stubborn rock on which previous peace plans have foundered.

EU's Solana, FRY's Milutinovic on Talks

LD1808153195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1350 GMT 18 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 18 Aug (TANJUG)—After the first round of talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Javier Solana, chairman of the EU Council of Ministers and Spanish Foreign Minister, said that "the dialogue was very frank and sincere" and that he is "insisting" on this assessment.

Solana said he came to Belgrade to convey a very clear message from the EU that the time for finding a solution to the conflict is running out and that an effort must be made to reach a political agreement in the short time that is still left.

The Spanish minister added that the EU is making efforts in this direction and that everyone shares the opinion that work must be done on reaching a political agreement which would give peace a chance.

At the same time, Solana said, "if an overall solution is found the sanctions against Yugoslavia will be lifted."

Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic [title and name as received], who took part in the Milosevic-Solana talks, said he was pleased to see a high-ranking guest from Spain visiting [Yugoslavia] in the capacity of EU chairman.

"As well as sincere, the talks can be classified as fundamental. The present moment is very important and we shall struggle for peace at all costs", said Milutinovic.

Asked whether he could assess the talks with the U.S. delegation, headed by Richard Holbrooke, and the European representatives, headed by Spanish Minister Solana, the Yugoslav foreign minister said that it is too early to formulate precise assessments since the whole package for resolving the crisis was still being discussed. "This is practically a fast-moving process", Milutinovic underscored.

"The U.S. as well as the Russian plan or the EU plan is geared to the same aim—to secure as soon as possible a peaceful solution particularly in Bosnia. We want to get rid of sanctions and credit for our continued struggle for peace in these lands," Milutinovic stressed.

One should transcend details in the interest of peace and tackle the essential issues and get out, in a sense, of this current situation so we can have a better future, the Yugoslav minister added.

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"The greatest interest should be peace. If this prevails in everyone's conscience we will be successful soon," Milutinovic said in conclusion.

Serb-Croat Deal To Give Boka for Osijek

AU1708175895 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 16 Aug 95 p 6

[Article by Zoran Markovic: "Rumors Intensify on Secret Deal Giving Osijek to Serbia and Boka to Croatia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After the fall of Knin, and the Croatian aggression on Trebinje, anxiety has taken over among the Serbian population in Boka Kotorska. People have been wondering whether the border on Debelo Brdo is safe enough, and whether Boka—which Tudjman has wanted for a long time—is to have the same fate as western Slavonia and the Knin Krajina. True, these days the Yugoslav Army has been regrouping toward the border, and there are a number of reservists in standard-issue and camouflage uniforms in Kotor, Tivat, and particularly Herceg Novi, but not in the kind of numbers as in 1993, when "the war for peace" was being waged.

The rumors about the sellout of Boka that can be heard in Kotor and Herceg Novi bars have been confirmed to us by a source close to the Yugoslav Navy, who understandably wanted to remain anonymous. According to our source, the report on a secret deal between Milosevic and Tudjman which would give Osijek to Serbia, that is, to the FRY, and the entire Boka Kotorska from Prevlaka to Jaz to Croatia, created some confusion initially among the officers in the Yugoslav Navy, but then turned to revolt and determination not to allow such a deal to be done with "the bride of the Adriatic." [passage omitted]

Although Boka Kotorska is known for its traditionally good relations between the Catholics and the Orthodox, which remained intact even during this war, recently there has been a sharp increase in the interethnic and interreligious tensions. [passage omitted]

This nervousness has been made worse by a recent proclamation by the Serbian National Revival, the leaflets of which have swamped the entire Kotor these days. The proclamation calls Milosevic the butcher of the Serbs, and the Serbian people are warned that under his rule all they can expect is further suffering, humiliation, and defeats.

The proclamation, by the way, end with the words: Death to the tyrant.

Perisic Receives U.S. Military Official

LD1808133195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1254 GMT 18 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 18 Aug (TANJUG)—Colonel General Momcilo Perisic, chief of the general staff of the Yugoslav Army, and his aides today received Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, representative of the U.S. joint chiefs of staff, who is in the U.S. delegation led by Richard Holbrooke which was received by President Slobodan Milosevic.

The press office of the Yugoslav Army's General Staff reported that Generals Perisic and Clark held a frank exchange of views on important military aspects regarding the situation in former Yugoslavia based on the latest U.S. initiative.

Gen Perisic Views Maneuvers; Army 'Ready'

LD1708191995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1841 GMT 17 Aug 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, August 17 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff Gen. Momcilo Perisic said Thursday that Yugoslavia was investing great efforts to settle the crisis in the former Yugoslavia by peaceful means.

Perisic, who was inspecting military exercises organised in the area under the responsibility of the First Army, said that the exercises were held to strenghen the combat capacity and combat readiness of the Yugoslav Army.

The officers and troops said they were ready and motivated to accomplish all set tasks, to continue developing their military skills and to resolutely defend Yugoslav borders in case of a threat of aggression from any party, the Yugoslav Army information service reported.

After the inspection, General Perisic expressed satisfaction with the level of combat capacity, the efforts and the morale of the troops and officers and with their sense of resionsibility regarding their tasks, the statement said.

JNA Activity in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina

AU1808092895 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 5 Aug 95 pp 8,9

[Article by Djuro Kozar: "Three Armies, One Command"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the Belgrade garrison of Banjica, at the celebration held recently following the promotion of a new generation of academy graduates to the rank of colonel, there were many generals, weapons, and pledges for peace. In the country whose soldiers

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have been taking part in the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina for more than three years, all those peace messages are leaving a dreadfully cynical impression. The new officers are already warriors, for they have finished the practical part of the final training on the fronts around Bihac, Sarajevo, and Mount Majevica. Some part of them, unfortunately, will return to the front in Bosnia-Herzegovina or in Croatia, as service requires.

While General Momcilo Perisic, chief of the General Staff of the so-called Yugoslav Army and a war criminal, played peacemaker at the celebration, his deputy, General Blagoje Kovacevic, was coordinating military operations of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia from the advanced command post at Mt. Tara. The generals in the so-called FRY have announced a state of alert in their army and activated their command post on the aforementioned mountain in Serbia. If they are really for peace, why do they need the highest level of combat readiness and why are they massing arms toward the Drina River, Srem, and the Danube? Why do they need the mass mobilization of reservists, unless they are getting ready for an even more direct military conquest?

Ojdanic's Formula

Is the fall of Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoc an additional reason for Perisic's latest haughtiness? At the celebration at the Banjica garrison, the president of unrecognized Yugoslavia, Zoran Lilic, stressed, as many times before, that it is a duty of his country to help the Serbs in all the Serbian regions as much as possible. His words will be checked these days on the fronts in Croatia. As early as on 24 February of this year, Zagreb GLOBUS published information about one armored and seven mechanized brigades of the Yugoslav Army concentrating in a position for attack. Those were the units of the so-called 1st Army of the Yugoslav Army, the strongest of the three armies that make up the ground forces, whose commander is Colonel General Dragoljub Ojdanic. Those forces are prepared and armed in such a way that they can start action immediately.

Parts of the 1st Army did a job for Karadzic in April 1992 by occupying Foca, Visegrad, Bijeljina and Zvornik. It was precisely the criminal Ojdanic who led those aggressor's formations. In the meantime, he rose from the position of commander of the so-called Uzicki Corps to that of commander in chief of Perisic's 1st Army. Later, those territories, having been taken and ethnically cleansed, were placed under [Bosnian Serb General Ratko] Mladic's supervision, but supplies of arms, spare parts, fuel, and ammunition and the deployment of "volunteers" were organized by Serbia. The logistical support from the FRY has continued despite the sanctions imposed. Milosevic is now talking only about peace, while everything he does is against it.

It is indicative that the so-called Novi Sad Corps of the Yugoslav Army, just like in 1991 and 1992, is the main point of the mobilization of the so-called volunteers from the FRY, from which they are sent to the occupied regions in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even the officers have remained the same. They are doing now the same job as they did at the beginning of the aggression. So, in June this year, more than 6,000 forced "volunteers" were sent to those regions. The command of the Novi Sad Corps received orders from Belgrade, from those same generals who are now telling stories about peace.

Directives From Tara

Combat actions by Mladic's and Mrksic's paramilitary formations are previously prepared, worked out, and drafted in Serbia. This is confirmed by radio messages that Perisic's officers were sending from Tara, which were, actually, additional instructions to the Chetniks on how to act in the offensive against Srebrenica. There, the so-called Drina Corps of the army of the Serb Republic was reinforced by an artillery regiment from Kraljevo, a battalion for landing operations from Nis, and some other formations. The reason for that is, probably, the assessment that Mladic take this "safe area" more easily if he had additional forces. The night before last, in accordance with the agreement on military cooperation between Karadzic's and Martic's para-armies, the center of Dubrovnik and Cilipi airport were shelled from the Chetnik positions around Trebinje. Yesterday, Martic's Chetniks shelled civilian objectives in Sibenik, Zadar, Sisak, Karlovac, Ogulin, Gospic and some other places. Gen. Mrksic, following directives from Mt. Tara and in cooperation with Mladic, fulfilled his earlier threats.

Let us recall, he told POLITIKA: "In the case of the announced aggression of the Croatian Army against the Serb Republic and Croatian Army assistance to the 5th Corps, the Serbian army of Krajina is ready to shell objectives in the entire Croatian territory."

In order to invigorate the Krajina army, which was badly shaken by the defeat in western Slavonia, Belgrade sent officer-rank reinforcements to Gen. Mrksic in mid-June. Those are officers of the former Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] who took part in the aggression on Croatia in 1991 and were transferred to Serbia thereafter. For instance, Colonel Slobodan Tarbuk, who four years ago served in Petrinja, has now been sent to command a corps of Mrksic's army, which has earned him a promotion to major general, which he could not get in the FRY. One of the returnees is Colonel Milorad

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Stupar, who has been appointed commander of the newly formed Krajina Corps for Special Actions, like the one that Mrksic formed in the Yugoslav army.

Although Veljko Kadijevic [commander of JNA General Staff in 1991] in his book *My View of the Collapse* writes that the JNA split into three armies—those of Karadzic, Martic, and Yugoslavia—it is still obviously one army, whose headquarters is in Belgrade, whereas the advanced post is on Mt. Tara. Pale and Knin are just branch offices of that post. That is to say, the Yugoslav Army is very much involved in the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, and whether it will engage itself even more directly, to save Serbianhood, will be seen in the coming days. Shells are falling on Knin, and the day when Pale will be a target of our artillery is not so far away.

Official Suggests Refugees Return to Croatia

AU1808103195 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Aug 95 p 12

[Article by M. Zivkovic: "Only Lasting Peace Suits the Serbian People"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Smederevska Palanka, 16 Aug—A guest at a talk show of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] in Smederevska Palanka last night was Radmilo Bogdanovic, member of the executive committee of the SPS main committee and vice president of the FRY Assembly Chamber of the Republics. He first emphasized that the international sanctions that have been in force for over three years have completely exhausted our country economically. The most important task in the present unfavorable situation is to look after the refugees from the RSK [Republic of Serb Krajina].

Bogdanovic said that those refugees who decide to stay in Serbia must embrace the possibility of settling in Kosovo, which abounds in publicly owned land and jobs for a labor force skilled in agriculture and, for that reason, housing for settlers will be built next to the big factories in the province.

On the other hand, this official pointed out, if the expelled Serbs do not renounce Krajina, they should return to their old homes and rebuilt their houses, as our stance is that everything that used to be Serbian must remain Serbian. For that reason, some of the newly arrived refugees were halted in Banja Luka and its vicinity so that they would find it easier to return to from where they had been expelled. Their return should be reckoned with because the Serbs will not renounce the territories for which they have shed blood and on which they have lived for centuries.

According to this speaker, the RSK government does not exist so to speak at a time when confused people are moving out of the western Serbian lands. We must establish contact with these unfortunate people and find out what actually happened during the recent aggression of Croatia against the RSK.

Regarding war and peace, as the most crucial issue for the fate of the Serbian people, Radmilo Bogdanovic was perfectly clear when he said:

"We not only do not need war, but also the situation of neither peace nor war. Only lasting peace suits the Serbian people."

Local, Federal Police 'Gradually Restoring Order'

AU1808075995 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 16 Aug 95 p 11

[Article by D. Dimitrovska: "Reason and Law Triumphed"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In Ruma, Hrtkovci, Kukuljevci, Golubinici, and in other towns in Srem, where a handful of Krajina refugees have moved forcefully into the homes of some Croats, Hungarians, Germans, and Serbs recently, reason has nevertheless triumphed—and law, too. Reason dealt with those people who realized that nothing could be achieved by force, and the law with those most persistent refugees from the RSK [the Republic of Serb Krajina] whom the police had to evict from other peoples' homes.

After the arrival of the members of the federal and the republican police, who are gradually restoring order, many residents of Ruma can now breath more easily. A burden has fallen from the shoulder of the headquarters for the reception and accommodation of the RSK refugees, who are helping the unfortunate people day and night but are also appealing to them not to move into houses without the approval of their owners. Nebojsa Stamenic, president of the Ruma headquarters and of the municipal government, told us that the situation in the town and in the nearby villages was, unlike a couple of days ago, satisfactory.

Each in His Own Home

What happened was that a few refugees forcefully moved into other people's homes. The police removed them effectively, Stamenic says. Law and order must be respected. We are helping the unfortunate RSK refugees who have been left without anything as much as we can. Numerous Ruma residents are accepting them into their homes, some of them are traveling on, some of them have been housed in collective accommodation. Nobody [words indistinct] and the headquarters constantly urges

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the refugees to proceed to other towns in Serbia, where collective accommodation is awaiting them. At the same time, the headquarters is calling on all unfortunate RSK residents who have found accommodation with their relatives or friends, but have failed to register, to do so.

As we have learned unofficially, Krajina refugees capable of military service do not wish to report out of fear of being mobilized. In some houses in Ruma, several families have found accommodation, and, as the residents told us, in a house on the high street, some 30 refugees have found shelter, however, none of them has reported their presence.

Ruma's Breg quarter, which is mostly populated by the Croats, was peaceful yesterday. The police have evicted those who forcefully moved into other people's homes, however, the people fear that this could happen to them again as some of the most persistent RSK refugees spent the night in trailers and tractors outside their houses. As a result of the constant police presence, some of them gave up and moved with the convoys to [words indistinct] accommodation while the police had to evict a group of Krajina refugees three times from a house of a Croat. [passage omitted]

Serbia

Seselj: 'Regime' Plans 'Betrayal' in Bosnia

AU1808083295 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Aug 95 p 4

[Unattributed report on press conference by Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, in Belgrade on 10 August: "Seselj: The Democratic Party of Socialists Is Preparing the Secession of Montenegro"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The situation has never been worse for the Serbian people, but we should not despair, because there is still time to oust Slobodan Milosevic and save the Serb lands," Vojislav Seselj, the president of the SRS [Serbian Radical Party], said yesterday at a press conference.

"Unfortunately, the SRS was right in pointing to the possible betrayal of the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], but many did not want to listen to us. From February until June, we went all over the Serb lands, and told people everywhere that the Belgrade regime was going to sell Krajina, but people could not take that seriously," Seselj said, stressing that now they were preparing to betray the Serb Republic as well.

"Milosevic has turned the military leadership against the civil leadership, through the generals paid by Belgrade—Gvero, Tolimir, and the like," Seselj claimed, appealing to the officers of the Army of the Serb Republic not to support Slobodan Milosevic, but their legally elected leadership. "If Karadzic falls, and the military junta takes power, it will create chaos and the Serb Republic will be in great danger," Seselj said.

Explaining the fall of the western part of the RSK, the leader of the radicals said that the greatest responsibility fell on the security officers, allegedly members of the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia, who had spread disinformation among the soldiers, thus forcing the militarily ready units to withdraw. "In Licko Petrovo Selo, Milosevic's 'red berets' disarmed and removed a large group of SRS volunteers, and similar things happened in other places as well, so that Krajina was actually handed over to the Ustashas," Seselj claims.

Concluding that the only salvation for the Serbs is to oust Milosevic, the SRS president said that, according to the information he has, the leadership of the DPS [Democratic Party of Socialists] of Montenegro recently held a secret meeting at which activities for the beginning of secession of the southern Yugoslav republic were agreed.

[Box, p 4]

Radicals and Rallying

"In principle, we support all the rallies that have been held in Belgrade recently, but we wish to take part only in a well-organized, large, and serious assembly from which serious political demands would be issued. We want such a rally to be organized by the Democratic Party [DS], the Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS], and the SRS, which would bear the responsibility for all that goes on at it, so that no police agitators like Mirko Jovic [leader of the Serbian National Renewal party] could infiltrate the speakers," Vojislav Seselj says.

"Rallies cannot correct the mistakes and the betrayal of the RSK, but they can ward off the events in the Serb Republic," Seselj added, explaining that the main, and maybe the only demand of such a rally would be the withdrawal of Slobodan Milosevic from the post of president.

[Box, p 4]

Ratko Gondi Arrested

Belgrade—Ratko Gondi, the SRS delegate in the parliament of the Serb Krajina and a minister in the government of the RSK, was arrested yesterday in Beli Manastir, without any reason or excuse.

As we discovered, Ratko Gondi wanted to take part in the work of the Emergency Staff of the RSK, but he was

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brutally prevented from that by the members of the State Security Service of Serbia, an instrument of Slobodan Milosevic. He was first interrogated and then sentenced and imprisoned without a trial, says the statement of the Informative Center of the SRS.

Patriarch Pavle Appeals for Aid for Refugees

LD1608181995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1555 GMT 16 Aug 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug. 16 (TANJUG)—Serbian Orthodox Church Patriarch Pavle on Wednesday sent a message to Krajina refugees urging them to keep their spirits up and don't give up hope, and the entire Serb people and humanitarian organizations to send them aid, the office of the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church said.

'The entire Serb people and many honest people sympathize with you and every one is trying to alleviate the loss and affliction. We are deeply confident that the justice of God will eventually come out in the open and, God willing, many of you will return to your homes,' Patriarch Pavle said in the message.

'We also consider our Christian and moral duty in this tragedy which has befallen us all, through the fall of the Republic of Serb Krajina and expulsion of Serb people from their ancestral homes, to ask all Orthodox Serbs, especially displaced persons, to refrain from intolerance toward any member of ethnic minorities in Serbia, the Bosnian Serb Republic and elsewhere,' the appeal said.

The Holy Synod office said a special session of the Holy Synod would began in the patriarchate of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Belgrade on Thursday.

The reason for convening a special session is, as set out at the synod, the tragic situation in which the Serb people found themselves following Croatia's aggression against Serb Krajina.

Metropolitan Amfilohije Denounces Milosevic

BR1808073295 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 17 Aug 95 p 3

[Interview with Monsignor Amfilohije, metropolitan of Montenegro, by Paolo Valentino in Belgrade; date not given: "Belgrade's Church: Tudjman Is Like Hitler"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Belgrade—"Never before in the history of the Balkans has such a shameful page been written. The current exodus and genocide are worse than Ustashi terrorism: What Hitler and Pavelic began is about to completed by the Croat, Tudjman, with the complicity of the international community, and especially of Germany and the Vatican."*

It was not exactly the voice of moderation and Christian serenity that we heard at the headquarters of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Partly because the man who received us in the beautiful hall of the synod was Metropolitan of Montenegro Amfilohije, number two in the church hierarchy and a well-known hawk representing the most radical nationalism. His cultured and heartfelt mode of expression—in perfect Italian—could not conceal his fanatical devotion to the Serbian cause, which now makes him the most authoritative adviser to Radovan Karadjic, the restless leader of ther Bosnian Serbs.

More significantly, the so-called democratic organization of the synod of Serbian bishops grants Metropolitan Amfilohije great influence over Patriarch Pavle: Indeed, the Serbian orthodox "pope" does not exercise unchallenged leadership, and every decision has to be approved by a majority of the church's most senior assembly, which is dominated by ultranationalists. Last month Pavle was virtually forced to go to Pale, in Karadjic's den, to address the Bosnian Serb parliament. It was also Amfilohije who masterminded the Synod's criticism of Milosevic 7 August and the proposal of a "government of national confidence" intended to "salvage the nation's honor and to restore the Serbs' moral and political dignity in the eyes of the world." "In this society, the Church is everything," we were warned by Stevan Niksic, commentator for Beta news agency, "and this should enable you to understand how powerful and risky Amfilohije's position is." [passage omitted]

[Valentino] Who bears the greatest responsibility?

[Amfilohije] There are both internal and external responsibilities. First and foremost, Milosevic's neocommunist government—power-hungry, shortsighted, and selfish. It deceived the Serbs of Krajina and then betrayed them and abandoned them, to themselves; it did not defend Serbian interests, and led the country down a blind alley. But the main responsibility lies with the European countries, and especially with Germany and the Vatican, which recognized Croatia too soon, without a real knowledge of the problems and of the history, and above all without thinking about the consequences of their actions. You see, this is the first time in European history that the internal administrative borders defined by a dictatorial regime—taking no account of any geographical, historical, or ethnic considerations—have been ratified by the international community and acquired diplomatic respectability.

[Valentino] You talk only about the tragedy of the Serbs. Have you nothing to say about the Bosnian Muslims massacred in Sarajevo, Zepa, and Srebrenica, about the Croats driven from their homes?

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[Amfilohije] It is not true. For us, it is also a terrible tragedy, a shameful page in Balkan history. It is the poisonous fruit of the decline in moral standards due to half a century of communist atheism. It is a paradox that the international community relies on the Communist Milosevic—one of the main people responsible for this situation—to find a solution.

[Valentino] Do you think that some day the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims can live together again?

[Amfilohije] I do not know. I must say that the present wound is very deep. It is scandalous that, despite the appeals of His Holiness Patriarch Pavle, the Catholic bishop of Zagreb, Monsignor Kuharic has spoken not a single word in support of these 250,000 unfortunates driven out like dogs from the land where they have lived for centuries. We trust in God and in human justice, but the essential precondition is that there be a concerted effort to halt Tudjman, the heir to Ante Pavelic, who, after Krajina, wants to complete ethnic cleansing in Eastern Slavonia.

[Valentino] Do you think that the defense of Serbian interests in that region should even include armed conflict?

[Amfilohije] I will answer you with another question: If I were to invade Rome, destroying your country's thousands of years of history and culture, should you not defend yourself? It would be simply your right. Our identity is threatened at present.

[Valentino] Do the Serbian people support you in this stance?

[Amfilohije] This is the voice of the people. The Serbs have suffered ill treatment ever since 1941—first the Nazis, then communism, and now these odious sanctions imposed by the international community, which are even worse than fascist period, because I would like to point out that Mussolini's policy in Krajina was not as brutal as the Ustashi's and Hitler's policy.

[Valentino] Is the solution partitioning Bosnia? Or do you think the new American peace plan could prove to be a turning point?

[Amfilohije] Any solution imposed from outside is bound to perpetuate the tragedy, bloodshed, unhappiness, and war. It is pointless to formulate abstractions in offices where people have no idea of our history. Partitioning or the current plans are not realistic hypotheses. It is necessary, first, to ask the people—Serbs, Croats, and Muslims—where they want to live. The fighting, the killing of innocent people, and the ethnic cleansing must be stopped, and there must be discussions between the three sides: Only thus can the fire be extinguished. [Amfilohije ends]

Our meeting was over. Monsignor Amfilohije led us to the conclave chamber to show us the great fresco that occupies the whole of the far wall. It portrays Patriarch Arsenije and his popes leading the Serbian people fleeing in 1690 to southern Hungary, then called Vojvodina. The metropolitan said: "That picture encapsulates our entire history—an endless exodus. We meet in this room to keep it always in mind and to remember Serb suffering."

Montenegro

Commission Gives Details on Krajina Refugees

LD1708185895 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1655 GMT 17 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Podgorica, 17 Aug (SRNA-BETA)—According to figures available to the Montenegrin Commission for Refugees, by today, 758 refugees from the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] have arrived in Montenegro.

Most refugees—160—have found accommodation in Tivat. A total of 132 people are in Bar, 112 in Podgorica, and 35 families comprising around 100 people are in Herzeg Novi. [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Bukoshi Threatens 'War' If Serb Refugees Settle

AU1808120495 Vienna Oesterreich Eins Radio Network in German 1000 GMT 18 Aug 95

[Report by Wolfgang Werth from Bonn]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the reconquest of the Krajina by the Croatian Army, hundreds of thousands of Serbs have been fleeing. Belgrade has redirected thousands of them to Kosovo, a traditional crisis region. This region, with its Albanian majority, is a center of Serbian repression policy. The Kosovo Albanians reacted to the Serbian suppression by proclaiming themselves as the Republic of Kosova, which is not internationally recognized. During his trip to Germany, the prime minister of this republic, Bujar Bukoshi, has frankly threatened war if the settling of Serbian refugees were to be continued in the Albanian territory.

Under international law, Kosovo is considered a province of what is left of Yugoslavia. Most of the 2 million inhabitants of Kosovo are ethnic Albanians. These Kosovo Albanians do not want to be governed by the Serb leadership in Belgrade. Autonomy aspirations were smashed by the Serbs in a bloody conflict in

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1989-90. In 1992, following a referendum, the Kosovo Albanians proclaimed the Republic of Kosova.

Since then, the Serbs have increased pressure on the Albanian majority. Thousands of Albanians reportedly lost their jobs to Serbs. Public functions are dominated by the Serbs. The media system has been brought into line with Belgrade. Belgrade was already trying in the past to settle more Serbs in Kosovo—because of Kosovo Albanian resistance, with limited success. Now the first few thousand Serb refugees from Krajina have arrived in Kosovo. Belgrade allegedly promised them good farmland—at the expense of the Kosovo Albanian farmers.

The prime minister of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosova, Bujar Bukoshi, warned in Bonn today: [begin Bukoshi recording in German] The regime in Belgrade itself is hardly concealing its plans to settle 100,000 Serbs in Kosovo in the next five years. If things continue developing in this way, there may be war. We Albanians do not want to be slaughtered like the Bosniaks, and the Albanians will defend themselves. Internal developments in Serbia show that the international community is doing just the wrong thing. It is adding fuel to the conflict by courting Milosevic while he is pushing ethnic cleansing in his sphere of power. The international plans for the pacification of the region are leading into another blind alley, which this time is dangerous. It could end up in war. We are not ready to let events take their course. [end recording]

The Kosovo Albanians have poor consolation: Many of the Krajina refugees are not ready to go to Kosovo to take over, as a minority, the role of border guards for Serbia once again—this time not against Croatia, but against Albania.

'Additional Numbers' of Serb Refugees Arrive

AU1708080695 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 16 Aug 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Reports throughout Kosova speak of additional numbers of Serbian refugees reaching Kosova yesterday. Sources in Istog reported that yesterday some 70 Serb refugees from Croatia were lodged in the Medical Rehabilitating Center in Banje of Istog. The report says also that the "Dubrava" prison house in Gjurakovc refused to shelter some 55 refugees. They were afterwards lodged in the "Korenik" hotel of this small town. The refugees, says the report, have arrived together with their tractors and other agriculture machinery. Their equipment is being stored at the premises of the Serb-controlled local agriculture cooperative.

Yesterday at 1 pm, some 100 refugees reached the Mitrovica train station, LDK [Democratic League of Kosova] sources in Mitrovica reported. They were transported by bus to the city center and were sheltered in the dormitories of the Mitrovica Medical Secondary School. Serb refugees are also expected to be sheltered at "Aziz Sylejmani" primary school in Mitrovica. The Serb-installed school principal, Slobodan Djordjevic, informed one of the Albanian teachers of this school, on the telephone, that the premises used by the Albanian pupils were to be used for sheltering Serb refugees, LDK Information Commission reported.

Sources in Ferizaj reported today that last night, some 20 buses with Serb refugees passed through the city center. They say that some of them were lodged at "Luboteni" hotel, others continued their journey towards Gjilan [Gnjilane], Viti [Vitina], and Kacanik. The same source reported also that the Serbian installed authorities are making preparations in the city sports hall. The place had been furnished with mattresses and other furniture, ends the report.

SPS Extends Invitation to Krajina Serb Refugees

LD1708192795 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1855 GMT 17 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 17 August (SRNA-BETA)—The Executive Committee of the Kosovo provincial branch of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] today urged Krajina refugees to come to Kosovo because this area "offers good conditions for accommodation."

The SPS provincial leadership has sent a request to the federal and republic governments to send as many refugees as possible to Kosovo, because other parts of the country are saturated, while—the SPS believes—in Kosovo there are many facilities that could be adapted to provide shelter for many refugees with moderate financial investment.

The Kosovo SPS also stressed that there are more than 30,000 hectares of state-owned land in the province which is not cultivated and could be given to the refugees. The SPS leadership said that there were no problems in the process of providing accommodation for Krajina refugees in Kosovo.

Serb Police Raid Albanian Homes

AU1708093795

[FBIS Editorial Report] Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English No. 683 on 16 August carries several reports on Serbian police violence against Albanians and raids on their homes.

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It is reported that on 9 August, the Serbian police summoned an Albanian from Ferizaj to "report" to the police station. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) sources note that "under the pretext that he had not reported his arrival to the police," the Albanian who has French citizenship, as he has been living in France for the last 26 years, alongside that of the former Yugoslavia, was "ordered to abandon Kosova as soon as possible."

Sources in Mitrovica say that, "in connection with arms searches," the Serbian police on 14 August raided the home of an Albanian resident in Mazhiq village. On the same day, another Albanian from Stanterg was ordered to "report" to the police station and was said to have been "ill-treated" by the police.

It is also noted that an Albanian from Urosevac was ordered to "report" to the police station on 16 August in connection with "arms possession." Sources in Urosevac report that the Albanian was "brutally beaten up" while in "police custody." The Serbian police on the morning of 15 August raided the home of a resident in Prizren. Following the raid, the Albanian was "detained" and reported "ill-treated in connection with alleged arms possession."

On 16 August, a Serbian police patrol in Vitina raided the homes of two Albanians at Lubishte village. One of them was reported "detained" after the raid and subject to "ill-treatment in connection with alleged arms possession." On 8 August, a Serbian police patrol in Suva Reka searched the home of an Albanian in Gjinoc village and arrested his 23-year-old son, taking him to the police station in Suva Reka and "beating him up severely."

Serbian police on 15 August detained the chairman of the Albanian Republican Party branch in Suva Reka. The activist was reported "beaten up" in front of citizens and "taken to the police station" afterwards, where he was held for six hours.

Military Journal on Paramilitary Separatists

95BA03021 Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 18 May 95 p 43

[Article by M.S.: "Vain Separatistic Hoax"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Skipetar separatists in Kosmet are not giving up on the effort to create their paramilitary organizations—units, staffs, and commands—looking to some supposed military showdown with the legal military force of Yugoslavia and Serbia (and the state, of course), and in order to realize their fantasy and bring about a "Republic of Kosovo."

However, all the secret separatist efforts to organize militarily are failing, thanks to successful actions and effort of Serbia's security agencies.

To recall, in September 1993 a 14-member group of the illegal Skipetar "Defense Ministry of the Republic of Kosovo," and "Minister" Hajzer Hajzeri, were sentenced to 67 years in prison. They had formed staffs and units in all of Kosmet's major towns, but the core of the units (for a planned army of 40,000) were trained in neighboring Albania.

In addition to that, 171 members of the illegal Skipetar "Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo," headed by Avdija Mehmedovic, were discovered in May, arrested in late November 1994, and tried the other day.

Because these versions of paramilitary organizations and organization of a quasi-police fell through, they have inclined to "a more fragmented" form of organizing territorial defense staffs by opstinas. But that alternative of theirs is also melting away like last year's snow. So far, such staffs have been discovered in Kacanik and Gnjilane, and the leaders have been arrested and are awaiting trial.

Thus, an investigation is being conducted in the Pristina District Public Prosecutor's Office against several persons of the Skipetar ethnic minority in Kacanik for the crime of association for the purpose of hostile activity, forming an illegal opstina territorial defense staff and an illegal opstina government. According to the request for the investigation, they formed paramilitary formations on orders from the DSK [Democratic Party of Kosovo], i.e., an illegal opstina territorial defense staff in Kacanik. In that headquarters, they prepared plans for attack, they drew up lists of conscripts and reserve officers of Skipetar nationality, they formed military units, they organized the illegal departure of their members to Albania for military training, and so forth. In addition, they have been procuring weapons, ammunition, explosives, and other arms and distributing them to members of their units. They have done this with the purpose of threatening the territorial integrity of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] unlawfully and unconstitutionally, through the use of force, and of separating Kosmet from Serbia and forming their own Skipetar state—"Independent Kosovo."

In Gnjilane, the separatistically minded Skipetars formed a so-called association of reserve military officers, a parallel executive committee of the opstina assembly, and an illegal secretariat for national defense. In addition to preparing plans and other enactments on the organization and activity of the paramilitary organization and preparations for a military showdown

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(with the Army of Yugoslavia and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia), they also formed so-called avenger teams of commando terrorists trained for special missions and reprisal against members of the Army of Yugoslavia and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. Those teams were, of course, sent to neighboring Albania for special training.

Vojvodina

Subotica Officials Against Housing Refugees

LD1708212695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1906 GMT 17 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Subotica, 17 Aug (TANJUG)—Deputies of the Subotica municipal assembly decided at today's emergency session that the town has no resources to permanently shelter and house refugees from Krajina because "this goes far beyond the town's material and financial resources," and at the same time it threatens the established interethnic and interpersonal relations.

The session, convened at the request of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians [DZVM], also concluded that the municipality could not agree to further division of land in order to build housing for refugees at discount prices, or to the sale of municipal apartments and other real estate at discount prices. Furthermore, the town cannot provide financial assistance for households which have voluntarily agreed to shelter a large number of Serb refugees from Krajina.

A demand for the relevant Serbian Government bodies to protect citizens and their property was added to the above conclusions, which were backed by the DZVM, the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians [Savez Vojvodjanskih Madjara; SVM], and the Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina. The assembly also concluded that the government recommendation that all empty houses be registered is an inadequate measure. [passage omitted]

Ethnic Slovaks Reportedly at Donji Miholjac Camp

AU1808124495 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 17 Aug 95 p 13

[TASR report: "On the Fate of Slovaks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "No members of the Slovak ethnic minority forced by ethnic purges in Vojvodina in the northern part of the FRY to leave the FRY for Croatia have reported yet to the Slovak Embassy in Zagreb. The embassy avails itself of information about their fate from local press reports, according to which Slovaks have been rounded up in a detention camp [zachytny tabor] in the border village of Donji Miholjac. Their number is not yet known," Matus Kucera, Slovak ambassador to Croatia, told TASR in a telephone interview.

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